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Abstract
The concentration of the population and socioeconomic activities in the
Metropolitan Area of Port au Prince (MAPAP) in Haiti has a negative impact within
MAPAP and on the socioeconomic development of the entire country. This
phenomenon, known as urban primacy, is increasing at an unprecedented rate in
developing countries. Urban primacy in the Third World is explained by scholars
studying the phenomenon and by dependency theorists. Economic decentralization,
based on growth pole theory, is one of the most frequently used policies for slowing the
growth of primate cities by focusing on development poles. In Haiti, the potential growth
poles are the regional capitals that have a constitutional mandate to promote and
manage the development of their region.
I have tested some of the assumptions of dependency and growth pole theories
on Haiti, using the eight regional capitals as units of analysis. Using migration,
geographic, and socioeconomic data, I have identified the strongest poles and
explained their attraction power and formulated policy recommendations that will
increase the chances of successfully implementing economic decentralization. The
research design is the case study.
The data show that MAPAP overshadows the regional capitals at the national
level and within the capitals’ own region, except for Cap Haïtien. However, the regional
capitals are the primary destinations for migrants within their regions. The strongest
poles are Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, and Port de Paix. Their attraction power is explained
primarily by their population size and by their connections to the international market.
Due to the selection criteria of the units of analysis and the limitations of the data
used, the support and rejection of the growth pole and dependency theories hypotheses
are not conclusive for the testing of these theories in Haiti or the Third World.
The Haitian government needs to be more aggressive in addressing the
consequences of urban primacy by implementing a comprehensive economic
decentralization. The January 12, 2010, earthquake brought light on the issues raised
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by this study. Fortunately, the Haitian government has expressed its vision for the
rebuilding of Haiti with an emphasis on decentralizing socioeconomic
activities outside of MAPAP.

Keywords: Haiti, regional development, decentralization, growth pole theory,
dependency theory, secondary cities, migration
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Introduction
I am from Jacmel, Haiti. I decided at a young age to find a field of study and a profession
that would give me the skills to make a difference and contribute to the socioeconomic development
of my country. International development and urban studies are interdisciplinary fields that seek to
understand issues facing the developing world, attempt to overcome them, and understand the
progress made in developing countries like Haiti. I chose the field of geography and land
management. After earning my master’s degree in France, I returned to Haiti but could not,
unfortunately, find work in my field in Jacmel. Most of my high school classmates were in the same
situation. I started working in land management, decentralization, geographic information systems
(GIS), and urban development for international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
other public institutions in Haiti’s capital city, Port au Prince. In the Metropolitan Area of Port au
Prince (MAPAP), I was struck by the omnipresence of shantytowns, the constant road congestion,
the inability of the governing institutions to provide basic urban services such as water and
sanitation, and the lack of security. Jacmel felt like paradise compared to MAPAP.
The present study reflects my personal interests, my educational background, and my
professional experience. I wanted to understand why a once vibrant city like Jacmel could no longer
retain its population, even when members of that population are trained professionals with skills
that are valuable to the city. I have found some answers during my professional experience
elaborating regional and urban development plans and by participating in the debate about effective
decentralization in Haiti: Jacmel cannot retain its natives because there are no jobs in the city. There
is no serious institution of higher education in the city; residents of Jacmel must move to Port au
Prince to further their education. Due to the lack of good health care facilities in Jacmel, parents and
families must often move to Port au Prince if a relative has a chronic illness. These are just a few
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examples of the circumstances that cause people to leave Jacmel. These issues affect all the cities of
the country outside MAPAP. A disproportionate share of the socioeconomic activity of the country
is concentrated in Port au Prince. MAPAP is often referred to as a primate city among the
policymakers in the country; this concept is further explored in the present study. The explosion of
MAPAP not only has a negative impact on the city itself (as I experienced while living in the capital)
but also on all the other cities of the country and their socioeconomic activity (as I experienced in
my hometown of Jacmel). The explosion of MAPAP has a negative impact over the entire country.
The phenomenon of urban primacy occurs in all parts of the globe, including developing
countries. Policymakers seek to address the problems linked to urban primacy by promoting
decentralization policies. There are several definitions of decentralization. One of the best general
definition is provided by Rondinelli, et. al.: “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management,
and resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central
government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semiautonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or
(e) NGOs/PVOs.” (Rondinelli 1981). In addition, Wolman (in Bennet, 1990) identifies different
types of decentralization: political decentralization, administrative decentralization, and economic
decentralization. The present study focuses on economic decentralization, as it is missing from the
current decentralization policy and the debate surrounding it in Haiti.
For more than two decades, the Haitian government has had the opportunity and the
constitutional obligation to address these problems by implementing sustainable political and
administrative decentralization policies. Decentralization is one of the innovations embedded in the
last Haitian constitution of 1987. It was included as a means to promote citizens’ participation in the
democratic process by transferring some of the power from the central government to local
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institutions managed by locally elected officials. The local institutions also became responsible for
the socioeconomic development of the territory under their control.
The debate around decentralization essentially revolves around amending the constitution to
write new laws that will make decentralization more practical and that will better define the role of
local institutions. The reinforcement of local institutions includes financial support to purchase basic
office supplies and equipment such as computers, printers, and copiers. It also includes technical
assistance to train elected officials and staff to better understand their role and perform their duties.
The proposed solutions have not ensured the success of an effective and sustainable decentralization
policy because the local collectivity will still financially depend on the central government. Indeed,
the local Haitian collectivities traditionally receive funds for their functioning budget from the
central government, which collects taxes over the entire national territory. Today, only the
municipality of Cap-Haïtien collects a larger amount of tax revenue than it receives from the central
government. Even in this case, the revenue is not sufficient to invest in socioeconomic programs.
Decentralization requires the ability of local collectivities to self-generate a steady flow of revenue
from collecting taxes on personal income and businesses. Given that socioeconomic activities and
infrastructure of Haiti are disproportionably concentrated in Port au Prince, there are limited taxable
incomes and economic activities in the other regions. To make decentralization a sustainable reality,
it is necessary to increase taxable incomes and economic activities outside MAPAP. This requires
allocating public investments and encouraging private investments in the other regions, i.e,
implementing economic decentralization; that is not currently the case in Haiti.
In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation published the National Strategy
for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document (NSGPRD) for 2008–2010 (MPCE November
2007). This document presents the economic policy of the Haitian government for this period.
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Unfortunately, this document does not present a different or comprehensive strategy to address the
consequences of urban primacy and the concentration of the population and socioeconomic activity
of the country in MAPAP.
In addition, based on the tradition of equal decentralization for each local collectivity (each
collectivity should have the same power and rights and receive the same amount of public
investments), scholars writing about the decentralization process in Haiti have failed to analyze the
interactions among the different elements of the geographic space (e.g., urban system, varying sizes
of cities, rural and urban areas) and the role that the repartition of social and economic activities
beyond the administrative limits can play in explaining the success or failure of the decentralization
process. More importantly, scholars failed to investigate the role that cities and the structure of the
urban system could play in the decentralization process. The discourse about promoting local
development outside of the MAPAP mostly revolves around promoting a more effective agricultural
development. To be effective, a national decentralization policy should have an economic
decentralization component that is based on reinforcing elements of the socioeconomic geographic
landscape, such as the major urban centers outside the primate city. This study will fill this gap in the
literature.
Instead of trying to achieve decentralization by promoting only rural development, my
argument is that the government should also focus on the development of a more diverse economy
and a more balanced urban system by channeling the population and socioeconomic activities
toward key urban centers. The main question to be answered in this context is where to concentrate the
efforts? This is the main question of every decentralization policy, and the field of economic
geography provides the best answer. Decentralization policies are implemented by policymakers
through “growth poles” (i.e., cities where public investments are concentrated and where private
investments are promoted). These cities are selected because of specific characteristics that will make
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these investments sustainable and promote growth over a defined geographic area. Growth poles are
also called “secondary cities.” These concepts are further explored in the study.
Based on my knowledge of the Haitian urban system, my intuition was initially that the
efforts should be concentrated in the regional capitals, which are the main cities and the
administrative centers of the upper sub-national territorial division called Departments. With the
present study, I have worked on confirming my intuition through scientific answers. The main
objectives of the study are:
•

To identify the cities that have the characteristics to be potential “growth poles”

•

To explain how these cities differ from the other cities

•

To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order to
increase the chance of success of the decentralization process and reduce the negative
consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve the
NSGPRD.
The dissertation begins with general historical and socioeconomic information about Haiti.

It is followed by the “Problem statement and Justification” chapter that presents MAPAP as a poor,
overcrowded, and unmanageable urban center and discusses the rural areas that are too poor and
environmentally fragile to offer a decent life to their actual population, the essential role that the
departmental capitals can play, and the constitutional requirement that is decentralization.
In the literature review, I have explored the concept of urban primacy and the consequences
of urban primacy in the developing world; the causes of the failure of decentralization and regional
development policies in developing countries; and the application of growth pole theory as a policy
framework for developing countries and dependency theory.
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I have used frameworks and theories from the fields of geography (growth pole theory) and
international development (dependency theory) to reach the objectives of this study. By doing so, I
have also tested propositions or hypotheses related to these theories in the Haitian context.
The choice of data and indicators reflects the availability of consistent data on the eight units
of analysis. For all data used, I present the rationale behind the choice to use the data as well as the
limitations of the data. I have used migration and population data to study the influence of the
regional capitals in the national and regional urban systems. I have used basic statistical analysis and
GIS to display and analyze the data. I have used the results to formulate policy recommendations
and identify the cities where socioeconomic activities should be delocalized from Port au Prince to
ensure the success of the decentralization process. Haiti is used as a case study to test some
propositions or hypotheses related to the growth pole and dependency theories but, although the
same problems occur all over the developing world, the findings of this study are unique and the
conclusion I have drawn should be applied with care outside the Haitian context.
In the concluding chapter I present an evaluation of my findings in light of the literature
presented and the contribution of the research to the body of knowledge on Haiti, decentralization,
dependency, urban primacy, and development theories, the limitations of the research and the need
for future researches. I will also discuss the policy relevance and implications of the research, made
even more relevant by the devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010.
The January 12, 2010, earthquake shone a brighter light on most of the issues raised by the
present research and makes its policy relevance even more important. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0
earthquake hit Haiti, devastating MAPAP and the cities of Legoane, Jacmel, and Grand Goave. This
catastrophe took the lives of an estimated 200,000 people and left half a million homeless. The
Haitian government estimates that between 217,000 and 230,000 people died; 300,000 were injured;
and 1,000,000 were left homeless. In addition, an estimated 250,000 residences and 30,000
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commercial buildings collapsed or were severely damaged. The port and the airport of Port au
Prince were also severely damaged. The loss due to the earthquake is estimated to be 120% of the
2009 GDP; 70% of the lost account for the private sector and 30% accounts for the public sector.
The January 12, 2010, earthquake demonstrated how MAPAP is poor, overcrowded, and
unmanageable. These characteristics of the capital and its surroundings explain the high death toll
and the inability to access some of the neighborhoods. Soon after the earthquake, thousands of
people took it upon themselves to flee to the countryside or other cities to escape Port au Prince
and the chaos, growing security issues, lack of food, and insalubrities.
The concentration of infrastructure, economic activity, and population in MAPAP became
the reason for the logistical nightmare for delivering much needed emergency aid both in the capital
and in the other cities affected by the earthquake. MAPAP has the only airport capable of receiving
large planes and the only port facility capable of harboring the large ships sent to deliver
humanitarian aid to the earthquake victims and survivors. Both facilities were severely damaged by
the earthquake and made it impossible to deliver the much-needed help, not only in MAPAP but
also in other areas. After some quick repairs, the port and airport became very quickly congested and
bottlenecked, delaying the arrival of rescue and emergency teams and the delivery of aid. As a result,
access to other cities could have been useful for delivering supplies to Port au Prince. The isolation
of the other cities also left their population out of attention of the international press and thus from
the international community concern for several days. Today, more than ever, there is an urgent
need to promote economic decentralization.
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General Background Information
This chapter presents the geography of Haiti; some general socioeconomic, historical, and
political data that depict a very poor country; an overview of Haiti’s tumultuous history; and the
complex history of the influence of the international community in Haiti. This information will help
the reader better understand the present research by presenting an overview of the context in which
it is conducted.

Geography
Haiti is located on Hispaniola, the second largest island of the Antilles. It occupies
approximately the western one-third of the island that it shares with the Dominican Republic. Its
surface is 10,714 square miles (map 1).
“Haiti” means little mountain (or mountainous land) in the language of the Tainos/Arawaks,
the native inhabitants of the island. The country is very mountainous, with steep slopes and small
inland and narrow coastal plains (map 1).
From north to south, there are the following mountain ranges:
•

Massif du Nord in the northern part of the country

•

Montagne Noire in the center of the country

•

Chaine des Mateux and Chaine du Trou d’Eau in the southern area of the center
of the country

•

Chaine de la Selle (includes Pic la Selle, the highest point of Haiti with a height
of 8,793 feet) and Massif de la Hotte occupying the length of the southern
peninsula from east to west

These mountain ranges are separated by a series of inland plains and valleys:
•

Plaine du Cul de Sac separating the southern peninsula from the rest of the
country
10

•

Vallée de l‘Artibonite in which runs the most important river of the country,
the Artibonite river

In addition, there are two main coastal plains:
•

Plaine du Nord in the North

•

Plaines des Cayes in the southwest part of the southern peninsula

The road network is rudimentary in Haiti. At the national level, the main roads link the main
cities to the capital, Port-au-Prince. In addition, local road networks link cities within a geographic
entity and are generally centered around the main urban center of the geographic entity (map 1). The
topography of Haiti and the poor state of the road network separate the country into isolated
geographic entities and consequentially affects the geographic areas of influence of the regional
capitals (Anglade 1982).
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Map 1: Topography and road map of Haiti

Source: Wikipedia (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/8/83/20090309223036!Haïti_topographic_map-fr.png)

General Socioeconomic Data
The population of Haiti is young and the country’s inhabitants are split between the rural
and urban areas. According to the Haitian Bureau of Statistics, by 2010, Haiti will have 10,085,214
inhabitants; 49% will live in urban areas and 51% will live in rural areas. The group age of 25-yearsold and younger will represent 58.4% of the population, and the population density will be 941.31
inhabitants per square miles (IHSI 2001).
The Haitian economy’s structure is that of a developing country. According to data from the
Central Bank of Haiti, the Haitian economy is dominated by the tertiary sector (retail, the restaurant
and hotel industry, transportation and communication, other trade and non-trade services), which
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accounts for 58% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP); the primary sector (agriculture,
forestry, cattle, fishing, and extractives industries), which accounts for 25% of the GDP; and the
secondary sector (manufacturing industries, electricity and water services, construction, and public
works) that comprises the remaining 17% of the GDP.
In terms of GDP per capita, Haiti is ranked 152 out of 179 countries by the International
Monetary Funds (IMF) with US$791 a year; and 125 out of 170 by the World Bank with US$771 a
year. In comparison, the second poorest country of the hemisphere, Nicaragua, is ranked 141 (with
US$1,025 a year) and 125 (with US$1,161 a year) by the IMF and the World Bank, respectively.
In addition, the statistical data of the United Nations show that 65% of the Haitian
population lives below the national poverty line: 53.9% live on less that US$1 a day and 78% live on
less than US$2 a day. The adult literacy rate is around 54.8%. The life expectancy at birth is 61 years
and there are 25 doctors for every 100,000 inhabitants. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western
hemisphere.

Historical Background
The Colonial Period
Haiti has had a unique and tumultuous history since Christopher Columbus landed, on
December 5, 1492, on an island known as Quisqueya, Haití, or Bohío by the Tainos Indians, who
were the native inhabitants (Wilson 1990). He renamed the island Hispaniola, after the Spanish
crown, and established the New World’s first Spanish settlement near the site of present-day Cap
Haïtien. He built a fort called La Navidad and left behind a crew of thirty before returning to Spain
(Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953).
The Spanish colonization of the island was based on exploitation of its gold mines. What
started as a peaceful cohabitation between the Spaniards and the Tainos turned into an open
conflict, the enslavement of the Tainos by the Spaniards in search of gold and the killing of Tainos
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leaders. With their horses, dogs, armors, and iron weapons, the Spaniards easily defeated the
peaceful Tainos. They also brought diseases that caused the eradication of the majority of the native
population (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953; Pons 1995).
In 1697, France and Spain in their continuing battle to colonize the New World, signed the
Treaty of Wyswick that placed the western part of the island, renamed Saint Domingue, under
French control and the eastern part (that kept the name of Hispaniola) under Spanish control. The
economy of the new French colony of Saint Domingue was based on the culture and transformation
of sugarcane into sugar. In the eighteenth century, Saint Domingue was the most prosperous French
colony in the New World, producing 40% of the world’s sugar. The French brought Africans to
work as slaves on the sugarcane plantations. In the late 1780s there were approximately 450,000
African slaves, 30,000 colonists, and 300,000 mulattoes in Saint Domingue (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou
1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953; Geggus 1990).
The everyday life of the slaves in the French colonial empire was regimented by the Code
Noir, or Black Code. The Code Noir was a decree passed in 1685 by Louis XIV restricting the
activities of African slaves and defining the relationship between African slaves, mulattoes and white
colonists in the French colonial empire. The Code Noir was a very extensive document that
established the rules for religious practices, marriage, food, the selling of slaves, working hours, and
punishment. Slaves were kept in subhuman living conditions.
Appalled by these conditions, some runaway slaves banded together to form independent
communities in the mountains, they were known as Maroons (Fick 1990). There were many attempts
to foment a revolution, but they were sporadic and limited in the number of slaves involved. When
the slaves were defeated, the participants were severely punished, tortured, and even put to death to
discourage future attempts to revolt. After several failed attempts, the slaves successfully revolted in
1791.
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The 1791 revolution was based on a grassroots movement that included a substantial
percentage of the slaves of the colony. The slaves found their inspiration in the French revolution
and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in August 1789 by the French National
Constituent Assembly, which stated that all men are equal. In addition, the slaves were bound
together by the willingness to be free and escape the inhumane conditions of slavery. They were led
by Boukman Duty, a voodoo priest. Under his leadership, the slaves, convinced that they were
protected by the divine power of the voodoo gods, made a pact to fight to death for freedom during
a ceremony held in Bois Caiman on the night of August 21, 1791. The slave uprising exploded on
the night of August 22, 1791 (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990).
The Haitian Revolutionary War lasted until the Battle of Vertières, which took place on
November 22, 1803, in northern Haiti near Cap Haïtien and was led by Jean Jacques Dessalines, the
first president of Haiti. Another famous figure of the Haitian revolution was François Dominique
Toussaint L’Ouverture (1743–1803), also known simply as Toussaint L'Ouverture, who was born
into slavery and freed by his master at the age of 33. He was fortunate enough to be literate and was
well-versed in French literature and the Enlightenment. He joined the Haitian Revolutionary War
after the French gave full citizenship to free blacks and free mulattoes on April 4, 1792, and
abolished slavery in February 1794; both decisions were fought against by the French colonists of
Saint Domingue (Cesaire 1981). Toussaint L’Ouverture rose to become the leader of the Haitian
revolution, fighting against the French, Spanish, and British to end slavery on the entire island. He
succeeded by consolidating all the revolutionary forces using his leadership. He defeated the Spanish
in 1801 and proclaimed the abolition of slavery on the island. He also published the first Haitian
Constitution of 1801, which named him emperor for life with near absolute power (Dorsainvil 1924;
Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990).
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Napoleon Bonaparte tried to re-conquer the most profitable French colony in the New
World and reinstate slavery in Saint Domingue. He sent his brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc
with the order to defeat Toussaint L’Ouverture and take control of the island on January 20, 1802.
After fighting against the French for months, Toussaint L’Ouverture signed a treaty with Leclerc
prohibiting the return of slavery on the island before retiring from power. Despite the promise he
made with the treaty, Leclerc captured Toussaint L’Ouverture and his family and sent them to
France as captives. Toussaint L'Ouverture died of pneumonia on April 7, 1803, in the Fort de Joux
in the Jura Mountains where he was jailed (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990).
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s story has an important historical significance even outside of Haiti and has
been intensely explored for example in 1936 by the Trinidadian historian C. L. R. James in the book
Toussaint L’Ouverture and The Black Jacobins.
The Haitian Presidencies
The Haitian presidencies illustrate the instability of the Haitian political life punctuated by
military coups, overthrows, and assassinations. From its independence in 1804 to the present, Haiti
has been led by 53 presidents: 9 served their full term, 23 were overthrown, and the rest were
assassinated or died in office (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Barros 1984).
The Haitian president who served the longest is Jean Claude Duvalier (a.k.a. Baby Doc), who
stayed in power for 15 years after succeeding his father, François Duvalier (a.k.a. Papa Doc), who
led Haiti for 14 years (1957–1971). François Duvalier was a physician who championed the fight
against yaws and malaria in Haiti’s rural areas. In December 1956, Haitian president Paul Eugène
Magloire left the presidency. A year later, Duvalier won the presidential election organized by the
army and took power on September 22nd, 1957. After a coup against him failed in mid-1958, he
started consolidating his power by creating the infamous Tontons Macoutes, a mainly rural militia that
perpetrated crimes and executions. On June 14, 1964, Duvalier conducted a referendum on whether
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or not he should be the president for life, which he won. His regime became a dictatorship plagued
with corruption, crime, censorship, a cult of personality, and defiance of the international
community (Barros 1984).
Before his death in 1971, François Duvalier nominated his then 19-year-old son, Jean Claude
Duvalier, to replace president for life. Baby Doc eased some of his father’s restrictions and allowed
more freedom of the press, which opened the gates of political and social unrest. He was
overthrown by a popular uprising on February 7, 1986.
The Haitian political life after Baby Doc was filled with military coups, failed elected
presidencies, interim government bodies, and the country’s first democratically elected presidents.
Leslie Manigat won the first post-Duvalier (although controversial) elections on January 19, 1988,
but was overthrown on June 20 of the same year by a military coup. Manigat’s government was
followed by two military governments led by Henry Namphy and Prosper Avril. Power was also
held by the first female president, Herta Pascal Trouillot, from 1990 to 1991. She successfully helped
organize the first truly democratic Haitian elections in 1990.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a young priest and proponent of liberation theology, won the 1990
presidential elections, but he was overthrown by a military coup on September 29, 1991. He was put
back in power by the U.S. government under Bill Clinton in 1993, and served the remainder of his
term until 1996. The Haitian constitution prohibits successive presidential mandates, and Aristide
could not run for re-election in 1996. Instead, Aristide’s right hand man and former Prime Minister
René Garcia Préval ran for office. He won the election and served the full term until 2000. In 2000
Aristide ran for president again and regained power. He left the country in 2004 because of growing
social and political unrest and the risk of a military attack supported by a former military leader. To
this day, Aristide insists that the French, Canadians, and Americans kidnapped him. He now lives in
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South Africa. Former president René Garcia Préval won the presidential election in 2006 and is still
in power today.
One of the first decisions Aristide took when he returned to Haiti in 1993 was to dismantle
the Haitian army and replace it with a civilian police force. By doing so, he eliminated the main agent
of political instability that fomented all the coups of Haitian history (Delince 1979). However,
increasing poverty, corruption, and discontent toward the government are at the root of a quasipermanent political and social instability, violence, and insecurity (Roc February 21, 2003). For
example, the impoverished population of Haiti was hit hard in mid-2008 by the increase in the price
of rice on the international market. Street protests paralyzed Port-au-Prince and turned into
violence, resulting in the deaths of several people. Several members of the government, including
the Prime Minister, were forced to resign under pressure from the population and the opposition.
Political instability and social tensions are the major constraints to Haiti’s development.

Political Institutions/Organizations and a New Role for
Local Collectivities
Haiti’s political instability is also reflected in the number of constitutions that have governed
the country since its independence. Twenty-three different constitutions have been used; each
redefining the political structures, the share of power, the length of the presidential terms,
election/nomination processes, and the ownership of land by foreign entities (Janvier 1886; Moise
1997). Today Haiti is governed by the most recent constitution of March 29, 1987 (Le Moniteur
Juillet 1987). This constitution was written a year after the end of the Duvalier regime and focused
on a better balance of power to prevent another dictatorship.
Haiti is a republic with three branches of power: executive, judicial, and legislative. In
addition to the central government, the new constitution redefines and grants more power to local
institutions governed by locally elected officials in order to promote decentralization. The intent of
decentralization is to reduce the power of the central government by transferring some of the power
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to the local institutions. It also aims to foster citizens’ participation in the development process and
create a better distribution of wealth.
The new constitution also divides the national territory into four levels of sub-national
territorial administrative entities: 10 departments, 42 arrondissements, 136 communes, and 519 communal
sections. The departments and communes have a capital that is traditionally the main city. The communal
sections are new local collectivities.
Only the communes and sections communales have directly elected officials. The governing organs
of the arrondissements and departments are formed by selecting leaders of the communes and sections
communales. These governing organs are the Assembly and the Council. The Assembly is the
deliberative body of the local collectivities, and the Council is the executive body of the local
collectivities (Oriol Decembre 1993; Le Moniteur Juillet 1987). The new roles and the new organs
are crucial for the implementation of decentralization.

The International Community and Haiti
The international community has a long history of involvement with Haiti, from its
independence to today. For years after 1804, Haiti was punished and kept isolated for declaring its
independence from one of the most powerful colonial empires, and it was later occupied by the
United States. In recent years, several United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions have been
deployed in the country to secure the democratic process.
The Early National Period
The international community history with Haiti began shortly after the country gained its
independence in 1804. It took the international community more than twenty years to recognize
Haiti as an independent country and an equal trade partner. Although the Haitian revolutionary
army defeated the French army and the new leaders of Haiti declared independence in 1804, France
formally recognized the independence of Haiti only in 1834 after Haiti started paying France 150
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million francs (about $25 billion in current U.S. dollars) as compensation for the loss that the
colonists suffered during the revolutionary war. Even the United States recognized Haitian
independence only in 1862. This delay in recognizing Haiti’s independence was a way for all colonial
powers of the time to discourage slave revolts in other colonies.
Unfortunately, during this time, the country remained isolated and fell into poverty, deprived
of markets to sell its agricultural production. In addition, the initial debt put a heavy burden on the
development of Haiti (Gaillard-Pourchet 1990; Farmer 2003). The end of slavery, the
implementation of new administrative structures and organs and the new economic policies adopted
by the leaders of the newly independent country profoundly changed the settlement patterns in
Haiti. These changes are further explored later in this study.
U.S. Occupation of Haiti (1915–1934)
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the political instability in Haiti reached a new
boiling point: from 1911 to 1915, six presidents governed the country, all of whom were
assassinated or overthrown. Finally, in order to protect U.S. investments in Haiti, President
Woodrow Wilson sent 300 marines to Port au Prince on July 28, 1915. The official purpose of the
invasion was to re-establish and maintain peace. However, it was the beginning of the U.S.
occupation of Haiti that lasted until mid-august 1934.
During the occupation Haiti lived through a period of relative political stability, with four
successive full-term presidencies. However, the United States gained increasing control over the
Haitian economy and government by having veto power over the main decisions of the government.
The United States also adopted a new constitution written by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, which lifted the ban on foreigners owning land in Haiti. The occupation
consolidated and extended American economic interests in Haiti. The occupation came to an end
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because of growing opposition in Haiti and the United States (Dorsainvil 1924; Bellegarde 1953;
Barros 1984; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990; Moise 1997; Farmer 2003; Molineu August 1973).
The economic and administrative policies carried out during the US occupation of Haiti has
long term consequences on the Haitian urban structure. These consequences are further explored
later in this study.
UN Peacekeeping Missions
The international community has been also involved with Haiti in six successive UN
peacekeeping missions. The first mission began in 1993 when the Clinton Administration reinstated
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The mission was designed to prevent another coup and ensure that
Aristide would serve the remainder of his term. Since then, Haiti always has some form of UN
mission that helps maintain peace and stability in a country plagued with drug trafficking and
political and social unrest. The UN missions also have the objectives of strengthening the Haitian
government and building the stable institutions necessary to build a democratic society. The UN
missions’ activities range from securing elections to training the new civilian police force, the Police
National of Haiti (table 1).
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Table 1: United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti
Dates of operation
1993–1996
1996–1997
1997
1997–2000
2000–2001
2004–present

Name of operation
United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH)
United Nations Support Mission in
Haiti (UNSMIH)
United Nations Transition Mission in
Haiti (UNTMIH)
United Nations Civilian Police
Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)
United Nations General Assembly
International Civilian Support Mission
in Haiti (MICAH)
The United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Objectives
1991 coup and military rule in Haiti
Stabilizing Haiti’s new democracy
Training of the Haitian National
Police
Training of the Haitian National
Police
Training of the Haitian National
Police
Restore a secure and stable
environment, promote the political
process, strengthen Haiti’s
government institutions and rule-oflaw-structures, and promote and to
protect human rights.

The International Community and the Haitian Economy
Haiti depends in large part on international financial institutions for its development. Haiti
has a total external debt of US $ 1.4 billion. Forty-five percent of this debt was accumulated under
the François Duvalier dictatorship. To ensure that the money will be reimbursed, IMF and the
international financial institutions imposed a Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) on the Haitian
government in 1997. One of the requirements of the SAP is the drastic reduction of public
investments in social services and a greater opening of the economy to the international market.
Because of the negative impact of the debt on Haiti’s economy and development, several initiatives
have been launched to lobby the debtors to cancel the debt.
The interactions among the successive internal and external forces (political, social and
economic) have played an important role in shaping the Haitian urban system. This link between the
role of the international community in the economy and the Haitian urbanization patterns is further
explored later in this study.
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Problem statement and justification
The main objectives of the study are:


To identify the cities that have the characteristics to be potential “growth poles”



To explain how these cities differ from the other cities



To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order
to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce the
negative consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve
the NSGPRD.

This chapter presents the urbanization patterns of Haiti and its impacts on the development of
the country. It focuses on 1) the effects of the concentration of the population in the Metropolitan
Area of Port au Prince (MAPAP), 2) the need to promote orderly migration from the rural areas to
the other cities of the country and the role that the other regional capitals could play. Finally, 3) it
explores the state of the ongoing decentralization process and its inadequacy in addressing those
issues. By its objectives, the present study will contribute to solving these problems.

The Metropolitan Area of Port-Au-Prince: Overcrowded,
Poor, and Unmanageable
Urbanization is a recent development in Haiti. From 1950 to 2003, the urban population
grew from being 12% to 40.4% of the total population. This growth has caused the demographic
explosion of MAPAP that includes the national capital of Port-au-Prince and the urban areas of the
surrounding municipalities of Carrefour, Croix des Bouquets, Cité Soleil, Tabarre, Delmas, Pétion
Ville, and Kenscoff. Today, MAPAP has a population of 2.5 million and covers a total surface of
1,300 square kilometers.
With 2.5 million people, the MAPAP represents about 25% of the total population and 64%
of the urban population of Haiti (figure 1) (IHSI 2005). It is 16.13 times larger than the city of Cap
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Haïtien in the north, the second largest city in the country. Although it occupies only 1/22 of the
national territory, its economic activities represent 90% of the national secondary sector of industry
and 75% of the tertiary sector of the national industry. MAPAP overshadows the other cities with its
size and influence. It has become a “Republic in the Republic,” the “Republic of Port au Prince”
(Anglade 1982; Anglade 1990).
Figure 1: Percentage of the total urban population living in each department

3%

4%

2%

2%

9%

Nor d Ouest

3%

Nor d
10%

Nor d Est
Ar ti boni te
Centr e

3%

Ouest
Gr ande Anse
Sud

64%

Sud-Est

Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003

MAPAP suffers from its success: the literature about the metropolis is very pessimistic and
alarmist. Manigat describes it as a chaotic landscape which seems impossible to overcome (Portes
1997). The growth of the city escapes all administrative control and the entire city has acquired the
physiognomy of a slum (Holly 1999). The metropolitan area is in crisis and is characterized by
violence, economic informality, and poverty (Fass 1978; Houtard 1997).
Public and private investments in infrastructures and job creation activities are not sufficient
to follow the rapid pace and growth of MAPAP. There is a shortage of jobs for the actual dwellers
of the city. The government and local institutions cannot meet the city’s needs for decent housing
and access to basic services. The city is very poor: 75% percent of urban dwellers work in the
informal sector of the economy; 25% of its surface is covered by slums where 50% of the
population lives in inhuman conditions without access to basic services such as decent housing,
water, sanitation (54% of the houses do not have sanitation), and electricity (Experoco International
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2003). Finally, 60% live under the poverty line on less than US $2 a day on which to survive
(Lamauthe 2002). The MAPAP is unable to provide newcomers with economic opportunities and
basic services.
MAPAP is also sprawling on a fragile physical environment. The site is a coastal plain
surrounded by the Morne l’Hopital, a mountain chain (Corvington 1991; Lherisson Juin 2004). The
development of the city on a fragile area presents a danger both for the environment and the urban
dwellers. The forest that used to cover the Morne l’Hopital has completely disappeared. The fertile
lands in the plain are completely urbanized, reducing the areas of agricultural production for a
growing population. Both phenomena have contributed in reducing the infiltration of rainwater in
the soil, decreasing the level of underground water and increasing the volume of surface water.
MAPAP dwellers frequently experience water shortages. Each year during the rainy season,
hundreds of houses are wiped out along with their occupants by the flood of surface water. The
same catastrophe also happens in the lower floodable areas (Holly 1999).
These problems are most likely to worsen in the near future: 63.80% of the total number of
migrants live in the Department of the West and 57.99% live in MAPAP; 84.10% of the number of
migrants from other departments live in the West and 78.46% in MAPAP (Table 2). It is necessary
to halt the growth of MAPAP in order to increase the impact of poverty reduction strategies and
sustainable development programs. This implies managing the natural growth of its population and
reducing the number of incoming migrants.
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Table 2: Number and percentage of the total migrants living in each department by place of origin
Place of origin
Place of
residence
South East
North
North East
Artibonite
Centre
South
Grande Anse
North West
West
Total
%
Urban
%
Rural
%
MAPAP
%

Urban
3,892
20,494
5,155
10,621
2,709
6,124
4,400
8,378
96,986
158,759
18.41
131,578
19.70
27,181
14.00

%
2.45
12.91
3.25
6.69
1.71
3.86
2.77
5.28
61.09
100.00

33,432
6.69

21.06

82.88
17.12

Rural
9,618
24,123
5,217
34,074
61,244
14,803
5,459
13,239
52,005
219,782
25.49
110,042
16.47
109,740
56.51

%
4.38
10.98
2.37
15.50
27.87
6.74
2.48
6.02
23.66
100.00

29,801
5.96

13.6

50.07
49.93

Total
13,510
44,617
10,372
44,695
64,643
20,927
9,859
20,201
148,991
377,815
43.82
241,463
36.15
136,352
70.21
63,233
12.65

Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003
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%
Other Dpts
3.58
5,033
11.81
16,128
2.75
4,813
11.83
15,874
17.11
5,993
5.54
8,754
2.61
11,456
5.35
6,209
39.43 392,756
100.00 467,016
54.17
63.91 414,385
62.04
36.09
52,631
27.10
16.74

366,419
73.28

%
Foreigners
%
1.08
1,384
7.98
3.45
1,637
9.44
1.03
2,660
15.34
3.40
448
2.58
1.28
1,003
5.79
1.87
849
4.90
2.45
321
1.85
1.33
712
4.11
84.10
8,321
48.00
100.00
17,335
100.00
2.01
88.73
12,113
69.88
1.81
11.27
5,222
30.12
2.69
78.46

7,117
1.42

41.06

Total
19,927
62,382
17,845
61,017
71,639
30,530
21,636
27,122
550,068
862,166
100.00
667,961
100.00
194,205
100.00

%
2.31
7.24
2.07
7.08
8.31
3.54
2.51
3.15
63.80
100.00

500,002
100.00

57.99

77.47
22.53

Rural Areas: Overpopulated, Impoverished, and
Environmentally Degraded
Migrants to MAPAP come from rural areas and the other cities in the country (IHSI 1989).
The peasants leave the countryside to escape poverty. Rural poverty is due to the destruction of the
environment, overpopulation, and the lack of economic opportunities and very limited access basic
services. However, maintaining peasants in the countryside will increase the environmental
degradation and the cultivable land will not provide them with sufficient income to live above the
poverty line.
As explained before Haiti is a very mountainous country. It has experienced extensive
environmental degradation due to long-term intense deforestation to produce charcoal (the main
source of energy in Haiti) or to use the land for agricultural purposes. The result is steep slopes
exposed to the action of erosion, reducing the cultivable surfaces and the productivity of the lands
(Anglade 1982; C.E.G.E.T. 1985; Anglade 1990).
Haiti’s rural area has a high population density living on already fragile land. The surface
suitable for agricultural activities is not sufficient to provide each rural household with revenue to
live above the poverty line. A recent study on poverty in Haiti shows that 90% of the poor
inhabitants in the rural areas live on between US$1 and US$2 per day per family. Fleeing the
countryside is the only hope for Haitian peasants seeking to improve their living conditions (UNDP
2002).
It is imperative to stabilize and even reverse the population growth rate in the rural areas in
order to reduce the human pressure on the fragile rural environment. Fortunately, the data from the
last Haitian census show migration patterns with an exodus from the rural areas and the
concentration of the population in urban areas (Table 2):
i.
ii.

77.47% of the total number of migrants live in urban areas.
63.91% of the total internal migrants (within a department) live in urban areas
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iii.

-

82.88% of the migrants from the urban areas live in other urban areas

-

50.07% of the migrants from rural areas live in cities

-

42.02% of the migrants are from cities

-

58.17% of the migrants are from rural areas

88.73% of the migrants from the other departments live in urban areas

The migration from rural areas to urban areas contributes to a reduction of the population
growth rate in the rural areas. It also reduces the number of people who will otherwise depend on
agriculture to make a living.
At the same time, MAPAP, receiving the major fraction of the migration, is facing
tremendous challenges and cannot provide the newcomers with the economic and social
opportunities that will improve their lives. The alternative locations for rural dwellers to migrate to
are the other cities of the country. These considerations should be included in poverty alleviation
and development programs.

The Departmental Capitals: Key Demographic,
Administrative, and Political Characteristics to Play A
Buffer Role Between the Rural Area and the MAPAP
With the exclusion of the MAPAP, most cities in the Haitian urban system are of small size.1
The frequency distribution table of the 124 Haitian cities (by size and percentage of the total urban
population in each group) illustrates this statement (table 3). While the number of cities with less
than 10,000 inhabitants represents 71.90 % of the total number of cities, this group also represents
only 9.34 % of the total urban population (figures 2 and 3). These small cities do not have sufficient
attraction power to capture or retain the flow of rural migrants trying to escape the extreme poverty
of the countryside as it is going to be explained later on in the study.

There is no legal definition of “city” in the Haïtian legislation. In the national statistics, all the municipal capitals are “cities” and their
populations are counted as urban no matter their size.

1
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Table 3: Number and percentages of the Haitian urban population by size of the cities
Percentage of
the total
Percentage of
Number number of
Cumulative
total urban
Cumulative
cities
population
of cities
percentage
percentage
9
7.44
7.44
0.21
0.21
58
47.93
55.37
4.8
5.01
20
16.53
71.90
4.33
9.34
25
20.66
92.56
11.37
20.71
7
5.79
98.35
5.92
26.63
5
1.65
100.00
73.37
100
124
100.00
100.00

Population
0–999
1,000–4,999
5,000–9,999
10,000–19,999
20,000–49,999
50,000 and up
Total

Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003

Figure 2: Frequency distribution of Haitian cities by size
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the percentage of the urban population by size of cities
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However, a limited number of cities are distinctive because of their size. About twenty cities
have a population between 15,000 and 20,000 (figure 3) with room to grow. These cities are more
likely to play a buffer role in reducing the growth of the MAPAP. As it is going to be further
explained later in this study, larger cities attract more migrants. They also already have a large
population to support large-scale socio-economic programs that will, in return, increase the number
of migrants, which will have an impact on reducing the growth of the MAPAP. Winning the fight
against poverty necessarily means enabling them to attract more migrants, retain them and retain
their own populations.
Seven of the departmental capitals are in this group. The departmental capitals are the cities
of Cap Haïtien, Jacmel, Gonaives, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté, Hinche, les Cayes, and Jérémie. All of
them except Fort Liberté have a population of more than 15,000 people. Besides their demographic
characteristics, the departmental capitals have specific political and administrative functions. They
are the sites of the Délégation and Vice Délégation that represent the political branch of the government
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at the local levels. The mandate of these institutions is to coordinate the activities of all the central
technical organs at the departmental level. The capitals are also the sites of, successively, the lowest
to the highest decentralized political and administrative organs, from the Assembly of the
Communal Section and the Council of the Communal Section to the Departmental Council and
Assembly (Bureau du Premier Ministre 2002; Le Moniteur Juillet 1987). Regrouping all these
administrative, technical, and political organs, the departmental capitals are centers of management,
coordination, and promotion of developmental policies. As such, they also receive an important part
of public investments in terms of services and infrastructure. Their demographic, administrative, and
political characteristics make them practical regional development poles.
Unfortunately, the regional capitals receive a very small percentage of the total number of
migrants of the country according to the 2003 census data. While MAPAP receives 57.99% of the
total number of migrants of the country, the average percentage for the regional capitals is 1.51%;
Cap Haïtien receives the highest percentage with only 5.16%; along with Cap Haïtien, only
Gonaives, Les Cayes, and Port de Paix receive more than 1%; Hinche receives the lowest percentage
with 0.23% (table 2). It is imperative to channel a larger flow of migrants toward the regional
capitals in order to reduce the growth of the MAPAP.

Decentralization, a Constitutional Requirement yet to
be Implemented
In 1987, Haiti adopted a new constitution. Decentralization (Title IV, Chapter I) was the
main innovation of the Haitian Constitution and was designed to promote participative
democratization by relocating the political and administrative powers closer to the population in
order to promote economic development and provide basic services to all Haitians (Gilbert 2000).
These goals were to be achieved by putting locally elected officials in charge of local administrations
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(ARD 1996; Castor 1997). Local collectivities would acquire administrative and financial autonomy
and become, henceforth, responsible for the promotion and management of their resources and
their socioeconomic development, and would therefore guarantee access to basic services to the
population by generating their own resources.
Almost two decades later, the Haitian government has failed to enforce the prescriptions of
the constitution regarding decentralization. The technical expertise and the financial resources have
not yet been transferred to the local collectivities. The local institutions and organs are not fully
operational. Only the institutions and organs at the communal levels are actually functioning
(Deshommes 2004; Oriol Decembre 1993).
The slow start of the process reflects both political reluctance and the difficulty of dealing
with such a complex challenge. Indeed, decentralization is primarily the expression of the political
will of the central government to transfer some of its power; it is also the will of the local
collectivities to build the capabilities and take on new responsibilities (Rondinelli 1978; Brunet 1997;
Rondinelli August 1984). Unfortunately, these necessary requirements are missing in Haiti (Sylvestre
2000; Bureau du Premier Ministre 2002; Brunet 2004). The constant political turmoil of the past
decades has also endangered the implementation of a policy that requires stability and a long-term
commitment from the central government (Rondinelli 1978; Hurbon 1996; Rondinelli August 1984).
The slow start of the decentralization process also demonstrates the complexity of the
decentralization policy and the difficulty in achieving a consensus on how to successfully implement
it. The debate surrounding decentralization in Haiti is raging: no one is openly against
decentralization, and the international community is openly supportive of it (Saint Vil 1999). The
literature tends to depict aspects of the actual process and characteristics of the local collectivities
that will make the process difficult, even impossible, to implement (Deshommes 2000; Oriol April
2000). The factors cited are the geographic characteristics such as the size of the local collectivities
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(INESA Avril 2000; Saint Vil Mars 2005), the socioeconomic characteristics, the flaws in the policy
itself, the number and fields of responsibility versus too little resources, and the lack of human,
technical, and financial assets of the municipalities. Finally, some scholars explain this failure by the
weaknesses of regional and decentralized political and administrative institutions (ARD 1996;
Cantave 1996; Castor 1997; Saint Vil 1999; Deshommes 2000; Deshommes 2000; Sylvestre 2000;
Deshommes 2002; Oriol April 2000; INESA Avril 2000; Cadet Déc 2001; Oriol Decembre 1993;
CNRA March 2002; Saint Vil Mars 2005; Prophete Nov 1999).
To solve these problems and facilitate the implementation of decentralization, some
proposed solutions are: reform of local taxes systems (improving the collection of the existing ones
and raising new ones), reinforcement of local institutions, redrawing of (administrative) boundaries,
and reduction in the number of local collectivities. Most of the solutions offered propose realistic
ways to design a policy focusing on the elimination of obstacles (Deshommes 2000; Bureau du
Premier Ministre 2002; Brunet 2004; Avilez 2006). The policy as well as the debate focuses on
political and administrative aspects.
In the tradition of equal decentralization for each local collectivity (each collectivity should
have the same power and rights and, receive the same amount of public investments), scholars
writing about the decentralization process in Haiti failed to analyze the interactions among the
different components of the geographic space and the role that the repartition of social and
economic activities, beyond the administrative limits, can play in explaining the success or failure of
the decentralization process. More importantly, they failed to investigate the role that cities and the
structures of the urban system play in the decentralization process. To be effective, a sound
decentralization policy should start by reinforcing elements of the geographical landscape that will
increase its chances of success. This study will fill this gap in the literature.

33

The concentration of the population in the MAPAP poses important environmental
problems on the city. This makes it very difficult to manage the city and provide basic urban services
and employment opportunity to a fast growing population. The high population density of the rural
areas puts pressure on the environment and increases poverty by contributing to the degradation of
natural resources. The regional capitals of Haiti have the demographic and administrative
characteristics to play a key role in reducing the flow of migrants to the MAPAP and in reducing the
human pressure on the natural resources of the rural areas. Unfortunately, there has been no policy
designed to enable them to play this role. Haiti has a constitutional mandate necessary to implement
decentralization but has yet to fulfill it. One of the questions missing in the debate surrounding how
to implement decentralization is where to start in order to have the most impact. This study will
attempt to provide an answer to that question and formulate policy recommendations to improve
the NSGPRD.
.
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Literature Review: Urban Primacy and
Decentralization Policy in the Third World
and in Haiti
This chapter reviews the literature about the concepts, policies, debates and theories used to
conduct this research. It covers urbanization in the Third World and in Haiti, more specifically,
urban primacy, its causes and its consequences on socio-economic development. It presents the rise
of decentralization and regional development policies in the Third World and in Haiti to address the
consequences of urban primacy and the application of some of the growth pole theory assumptions
and hypothesis to design and evaluate decentralization policies.

The Concept of Urban Primacy
The concept of primate city first appeared in 1939 in an article in the Geographical Review
written by geographer Mark Jefferson. Today this concept is largely used in multidisciplinary
settings. It refers to the largest city of a country in relationship, in size, to the second largest city. If
primate, the largest city stands alone in the national urban system, and most of the economic,
cultural, and intellectual resources of the country are concentrated there. Once a city reaches that
stage, “this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away
from all of them in characters and well as in size … It becomes the primate city.” (Jefferson), p.227).
This trend is worldwide and there is a “Law of the Primate City” where the “largest city shall be
super eminent and not merely in size, but in national influence” (Jefferson, p.227). A few countries,
such as Germany or Switzerland, are exceptions to this rule. The author explains these exceptions by
unusual local circumstances such as spatial administrative structures or economic policies.
Urban primacy is measured, in terms of population size, as the ratio of the population of the
largest city to the population of the two next largest cities. Jefferson found a ratio of 100 (100
representing the population of the primate city) for the largest city and, respectively 30 and 20 for
the second and third. This comparative technique is still used today to assess the level of primacy of
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a country. Haiti is an example of extreme urban primacy with the MAPAP ratio at 100 (population
of 2.5 millions inhabitants), 8.1 for Cap Haïtien the second most populous city (population of
204,508 inhabitants) and 6.42 for Gonaives, the third (population of 160,501 inhabitants).

The Causes and Consequences of Urban Primacy in the
World, in the Third World and in Haiti
Most scholars agree about the different factors that explain urban primacy. This chapter
presents the causes and consequences of urban primacy in general, in the Third World and in Haiti.
This chapter also presents urban primacy in the context of the general development theories as these
theories relate to urbanization in the developing world.
The concept of Urban Primacy
Jefferson (1939) acknowledges the diversity of original factors that will cause one city to
exceed the others in the urban system. Such factors include political structure (centralized versus
decentralized government systems), economic policies, geography of the national territory, and
infrastructure. These factors echoed the ones identified in regional studies conducted by Stewart
(1960), Ginsburg (1955), and Browing (March 1958): economic (export-oriented economies), urban
and human settlement history, colonization, and national land planning policies. Urban primacy
occurs at different levels depending on the strength or the combination of these factors.
Urban primacy affects all parts of the globe, such as Western Europe and Australia (Stewart
1960), Southeast Asia (Ginsburg 1955; Doan 1995; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and
Alwosabi 2003), Africa (Doan 1995) and Latin America (Doan 1995; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003;
Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Browning March 1958). However, the level of urban primacy is
increasing at an unprecedented rate in developing countries (Kasarda 1991) and more specifically in
Latin American countries (Potter 1998; Sally 1998; Jacquemin 1999; Drakakis-Smith 2000). Urban
systems in Third World countries are dominated by one or a limited number (two to three) of
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metropolises that overshadow the other cities with their size and economic influence (Andrei 1982;
Kelly 1984; Kasarda 1991; Josef 1997; Potter 1998). The level of urban primacy is highest in Latin
America (Morse 1962; Angotti 1987; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003).
Urban primacy is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Third World, where it is reaching
unprecedented levels. Urbanization in the majority of Third World countries is characterized by its
recent rapid increase and high level of urban primacy. Indeed, the percentage of the urban
population grew from 17.9% in 1950 and should reach 57.1% in 2030 in the less-developed
countries. The increase is even more important for the least developing countries (LDC), where the
percentage of the urban population grew from 7.4% to 43.3%.2 There are significant differences
within the Third World. The Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is the most urbanized
(41.9% in 1950) and shows the highest increase rate, with an estimated 84.6% of its population
living in cities in 2030 and 42.7% more in 80 years. The least urbanized region is the African
continent, with only 14.9% of its population living in cities in 1950. However, the continent shows
the second most important increase and should have 53.5% of its population living in cities by 2030.
3

Haiti is also witnessing a rapid urbanization: the urban population represented 12 % of the total

population in 1950 and 40.4 % in 2003.
The Third World is also witnessing an increase of mega cities: in 2006, 44 of the 100 largest
cities in the world were located in developing countries across Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
These mega cities have populations ranging from 3.3 million for Caracas, the Venezuelan capital to
19.24 million for Mexico City. Although countries like India or Brazil have several mega cities, most

2

Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=1

3
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Third World countries have only one or two mega cities. 4 The MAPAP of Haiti is a mega city with
2.5 million inhabitants.

Urban primacy has devastating effects both on the primate city and on the development of
nations in the Third World. Employment opportunities, educational infrastructure and health, social
and cultural services, economic activities, and modern equipment are all concentrated in the primate
cities. These assets attract migrants to the primate cities more than other areas of the country; they
also perpetuate and increase urban primacy. Unfortunately, even though these assets are available in
the primate cities more than anywhere else, they cannot accommodate and fulfill the needs of the
fast-growing population. The new comers and a large percentage of the population does not have
access to employment, economic opportunities, decent housing, health care and other basic services.
They live in slums neighboring the affluent areas of the primate city. This situation creates social and
spatial exclusions that are at the basis of most of the problems in Third World mega cities. (Fay
2005; Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2006; World Bank. Europe and Central Asia Region.
Infrastructure Sector Unit. 2006). Unemployment and lack of basic services such as decent housing,
health care, clean water, and sanitation often characterize primate cities and affect their population.
National and local authorities neither have the resources nor the administrative structures to plan
and equip the mega cities that are plagued with slums (Davis 2006) and violence (Moser and
McIlwaine 2006). An increasing number of urban dwellers are poor, and the percentage of urban
dwellers living below the poverty line increases with urban primacy (Fay 2005).
Moreover, the concentration of economic activities in one or a few urban centers creates a
polarized system that inhibits the socioeconomic development of the peripheral regions. Urban
primacy creates gaps within the national urban system. As a result, the other urban centers are
4

http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-population-125.html
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unable to play innovation diffusion and development roles over their surrounding areas (Pedersen
1970; Brown 1981). Regional economic growth and integration are restrained (Weathon 21;
Boudeville 1966; Coraggio 1973; Griffith 1979; Claval 1995). For instance, in his book “Paris and
the French desert” (1947), the geographer Jean Francois Gravier (Gravier 1947) describes the
French capital as a predator stating that: “in every aspects, the Parisian agglomeration conducted
itself since 1850, not as a metropolis invigorating its hinterland but as a monopolizing group
devouring all the nation’s substance” (page 74). Urban primacy has a negative effect on the overall
socioeconomic development of a country (Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and Alwosabi
2003).
As proof of the previous assertions, the small size of the other cities of the Haitian urban
system as described (table 3) and the disproportionably large number of migrants moving to the
MAPAP (table 2) illustrate the impact of the MAPAP on the other cities. In addition, my personal
experience and the experience of childhood friends, as explained in the introduction, show the
inability of cities outside of the primate city to retain their population. I have tested the assumptions
that the MAPAP overshadows the regional capitals and all the other cities of the Haitian urban
system.
Urban Primacy and Development: from Modernization Theory to
Dependency Theory
The general development theories and more specifically dependency theory explain urban
primacy in the context of the overall development process. Dependency theory is one of the main
general development theories. The other major theories are the World System Theory, Urban Bias
Theory and Modernization Theory that explain the spatial implications of the ties of developing
economies to the world economy. They all point out the role in urban primacy but fail to study the
other cities.
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The failure of Modernization Theory as a Policy Framework
Scholars and researchers in Latin America have developed dependency theory in opposition
to modernization theory, one of the main development theories developed during the 1950s and
1960s. Modernization theory explains the development process by the diffusion of the capitalist
economic system and the integration of the national economies in the system (Rostow 1962).
From the modernist point of view, the city is a key factor in the introduction and the
diffusion of modernity (Hirschman, 1958). Foreign capital should be invested to promote
industrialization in urban centers and modernize agriculture following the path of the developed
countries. This process increases urban growth, and urbanization is one of the principal
characteristics of a modern, developed economy. The mechanism of development from the urban
centers is based on the concept of natural growth poles and the central place systems. The city is
perceived as a pole from where the development process will start (Hirschmann, 1958). It creates
the polarization of the economic region by concentrating the resources in a single point. This
polarization is essential in the early stage of economic development. It produces important
economies of scale and allows for the maximum use of scarce resources. However, the impacts of
this economic growth will induce the development of each level of the national urban system. In the
end, the modern values will reach the lowest level of the urban system and then the rural areas. This
process, known as the “polarization reversal” (Richardson 1977), is inevitable and spontaneous. It
does not require any public investment. The process is automatic and linked to capitalist expansion.
Urbanization should induce development.
Modernization theory has shaped economic development policies in Latin America in the
post-World War II period. External capital investments have been used to promote intensely
industrial development (Bradshaw et al., 1991, 1991; Bornschier, 1981, Evens et al., 1980). An
increasing part of the agriculture of the Third World is also financed by foreign investments and
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became essentially export-oriented. However, the predicted growth and development did not occur
at the expected level and rhythm. Instead, in the post-colonial era, Third World countries found
that they were trapped in a new form of dependency toward international capitalism and
multinational corporations (Peter and Timberlake, 1980). The financiers selected the goods, both
industrial and agricultural, depending on the demand in the international market. The decrease of
the price of a given crop in the international market may cause the collapse of an entire economy
(e.g., the Ivory Coast and Cacao). The Third World countries also experienced unprecedented urban
growth. However, poverty and underdevelopment is also the main characteristic of most of these
countries and their cities. The automatic induction of development from the urban centers did not
happen.
Some authors explain the limitations of the effects of modernity as a vicious cycle. Internal
and external economies of scale will perpetuate the “initiated” polarization and unequal
development. Therefore, the pole will attract more and more of the forces of the economy and the
reversal effects on the countryside will remain relative (Gunnar; Myrdal 1964; Myrdal 1978; Myrdal
1990).
Dependency Theory, Urbanization and Urban Primacy in the Third World
In reaction to the failure of the application of modernization theory in the developing world,
Latin American scholars have developed dependency theory or dependencia explaining
underdevelopment by the historical spread of capitalism. The result of the process is the enrichment
of the center at the detriment of the periphery (Cardoso and Faletto, 1971). In this global process,
the periphery is the Third World.
While traditional scholars explain capitalist expansion by external, global forces, Cardoso and
Faletto (1971) adopted an innovative historical structural approach integrating both external and
internal forces. The forces are not only economic but political and social as well. Fernando Henrique
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Cardoso and Enzo Feletto in their book “Dependency and Development in Latin America” (1979)
argue that dependency is not only due to external factors. It had been established and perpetrated
because there is a coincidence between the capitalistic values and the economic interests of national
dominating classes. They adopted a historical-structural approach to explore the social process that
instituted but also perpetrated inequalities between center and periphery and among the diverse
social groups in the periphery. They explore the relationships between external and internal factors /
actors and the social forces toward changes or self-perpetuation. They concluded that the different
forms of national dependency can be explained by the interactions between all the actors.
Some scholars have explained urban primacy in Third World countries by citing the
dependent nature of their economies (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier 1981; Bradshaw 1991).
The cash-crop agriculture of the Third World is increasingly export-oriented and is produced for the
international market. This strategy is encouraged by international financial institutions to help poor
countries acquire the hard currency necessary to pay their debts (Ridell Jul-97). However, the
countries are using their land to produce staples for the external market instead of producing goods
for internal consumption. In return, they rely on the international markets for basic goods such as
alimentary products. These two factors combined create increased economic activity in the cities,
specifically those with international port facilities. International port facilities require large public
investments and the governments, because of their limited resources, often select one or a few cities
for this purpose, increasing their attraction over the other cities in the urban system and favoring
urban primacy.
Third World governments are also encouraged, specifically by the Bretton Woods
Institutions (The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), to promote industrial
development. Industrial development is also dependent and creates urban primacy (Todaro 1977;
Bornschier 1981). The capital that is invested is mostly foreign and the production is for the
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international market. These policies find an echo in national economic groups eager to benefit from
the advantages of a global economy (Cardoso 1971). The implementation of industrial activities and
the exportation of production require important investments in infrastructure such as port facilities,
roads, electricity, and water. Again, the governments, because of their limited resources, often select
one or a few cities, increasing their attraction over the other cities in the urban system and favoring
urban primacy.
Dependency Theory and Regional Urban Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean
However, recent studies have shown a decrease in urban primacy in three Latin American
countries and five Caribbean countries, including Haiti (Portes 1989; Portes 1994). They show that
these changes in the urbanization process are due to profound transformations induced by the
economic crisis of recent years and seem to reflect the rapid adjustment of Latin American countries
to the debt-induced economic crisis. The decrease in urban primacy was observed in countries that
have developed export-production zones and export-assembly plants in the search for new sources
of foreign exchange. However, this is not sufficient to explain the decrease of the primate cities.
Three additional factors need to be considered: the locations of export zones, their relative viability,
and the growth of other foreign-oriented sectors such as tourism and agriculture. Rondinelli (1983)
has identified the same factors to explain the dynamic of growth of secondary cities in developing
countries. Dependency alone does not explain the level of urban primacy: national and regional
factors should also be integrated in the explanation. Moreover, the same factors that explain urban
primacy also explain the growth of other cities within the urban system. The assumption is that cities
with stronger ties with the international market will grow faster than the other cities. These last
findings require further research, this assumptions is tested in the present study filling a gap in the
literature.

43

There are four principal measure of economic dependency is measure mainly have been
tested and widely accepted (Van Rossem 1996): three measures of market dependency and one
measure of investment dependency.
Trade market dependency indexes measure the extent of exposure of the economy to the
international market. There are three:
•

Trade market dependency: is the ratio of the total foreign trades to GDP. Trade market
dependency is conceptualized by the ratio of foreign trade to the GDP. It measures the
exposure of a country to the global economy. An economy is trade dependent if the total
of foreign trade represents at least 1 % of its GDP. Rossem suggested this cutting point
because “1% of the GDP is substantial”. The loss of these revenues can have damaging
impacts on the economy with major consequences for employment and other related
sectors of the economy.

•

Trade partner concentration: measure the percentage of export - import with each trade
partner. Having a few trade partners puts peripheral economies in a dependent situation
toward the demands on the partners national market. A decrease of the demand can
result in enormous difficulty to sell the production or the necessity to sell at a lower
price.

•

The trade concentration measure the percentages of export - import with each trade
partner.

•

Trade composition index: extend to which a country import raw and manufacturing
products. The measures used here is the percentages of raw and manufactured goods in
the total of the exports.

The investment dependency index assesses the extent to which is dependent on foreign
investments. The measure used is the ratio of net foreign investment to GDP.
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The data to compute some these indexes are available at the national level but not at the subnational level in Haiti. The only data pertaining to international trade available are the import taxes.
The import taxes are used as a proxy to measure the level of dependency of the economy of the
regional capitals toward the international market.

Dependency, Urban Primacy and Urban System in Haiti: an
Historical Overview
In Haiti, today’s urban primacy level, location and size of the regional capitals find their
roots in the country’s urban history and the linking of the Haitian economy with the international
market. The colonial period (1492–1804) marks the establishment of an urban system with the main
purpose of exploiting the resources of the colony for the benefit of the colonial power. During the
French colonial period, industrial development was almost entirely limited to producing sugar from
sugarcane. The entire production was shipped to France and Europe. The economy of Saint
Domingue was completely dependent of the international market.
As a result, the urban network of Hispaniola (and later Saint Domingue) was composed of
small inland urban centers and a more developed network of port cities. The inland urban centers
served as concentration/transit points for the exportation of agricultural products. They were mainly
established in the heart of the most productive regions. The coastal urban centers mainly served as
gateways for raw products (gold, coffee, sugarcane) from the hinterland to the colonial metropolis.
The smallest coastal cities were linked by coastal trade to the most important cities, from which
goods were imported and exported between Saint Domingue and Spain and later France (Geggus
1990; Knight 1991).
In addition, Haiti was a typical exploitation colony ruled by the “predominantly
monopolistic” French colonial policy (Knight 1991) that limited administrative and political local

45

power (Cardoso 1971). Therefore, the administrative and political status did require any important
administrative centers and did not induce any major urban growth. As a result, the towns of
eighteenth-century Saint Domingue surprised the visitors by “their extremely small size relative to
the volume of trade that they handled even by the standard of colonial plantation societies” (Geggus
1990). All of today’s regional capitals are former colonial main port cities, except for Hinche. The
location of the main cities illustrates the role of economic dependency they have played in the shape
of Saint Domingue’s urban system.
In the early national period, the new country sought to replace the former colony on the
international market by producing the same agricultural goods but the new administrative structures
and the end of slavery introduced some important changes in the urban system. They adopted the
colonial economic policy maintaining the dependency of the Haitian economy toward the
international market. The colonial urban system kept its economic functions as concentration points
and gateways for the exportation of agricultural goods (Renaud 1934; Madiou 1947/1948; James
1949; Moral 1961; Thebaud 1967; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990).
The new leaders also established political and administrative structures that reinforced the
existing urban centers and favored the rise of new ones. The existing urban centers became the sites
for the political and administrative powers of the new rulers, where they established the principal
organs of control and local political (Madiou 1947/1948; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990). This induced the
growth of the main urban centers.
Finally, the end of slavery introduced changes in the urban landscape. The newly freed
slaves left the former plantations to migrate to the cities and towns and establish new
agglomerations and communities. The end of slavery also boosted the growth of the main urban
centers.
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The American occupation marked another turning point in the level of dependency of the
Haitian economy and in the shape of the Haitian urban system and more importantly the raise of
Port au Prince as a primate city. The occupation introduced important changes to the economy, the
administration, and the transportation system. The occupant imposed a series of reforms allowing
and reinforcing American investments in the national economy in diverse sectors such as agriculture
and transportation (Doura 2001). The constitution had been mandated to allow foreigners to own
lands, inducing the injection of foreign capital in the country. Other laws allowed the expropriation
of the farmers to reinstate the big plantations controlled by foreign investors, such as the contractor
Donald McDonald (Doura 2001). The flow of foreign investments touched other sectors such as
mining (e.g., copper, bauxite) or subcontracts in clothing, sport equipments, or telecommunication
(Turnier 1955; Pierre Charles 1967). The investments in agriculture and the expropriations deprived
small farmers of their land and forced more of them to migrate to the urban centers, where limited
investments had been made in urban economic activities. The American occupation of Haiti reenforced the dependency of the Haitian economy toward the international market.
Another consequence of the American occupation of Haiti is the rise of the capital to the
rank of primate city. The investments had been almost exclusively made in Port-au-Prince. The
economic changes increased urban-rural migration toward the main urban centers, but mostly
towards Port-au-Prince. The occupation force established administrative structures to ensure the
overall control of the economy and maintain political stability. To do so, it reinforced the central
administrative power and weakened the local institutions; it also made changes in the existing
infrastructure to support its policy. For example, it closed some of the regional ports and built roads
linking the main regional cities to Port-au-Prince (C.E.G.E.T. 1985). The main regional urban cities
lost a progressively larger part of their economic power and resources, to the benefit of Port-auPrince. The American occupation of Haiti played a determining role in the structure of the actual
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urban system, characterized by the primacy of the capital (Corvington 1991). The primacy of Port au
Prince is one of the consequences of the dependency of the Haitian economy under the American
occupation (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier 1981; Bradshaw 1991).
After the U.S. occupation the successive Haitian governments, because of their limited
resources and the desire to control all aspects of the country’s political life, kept the same politicoadministrative structure and infrastructure. This once again increased the dependency of the Haitian
economy and contributed to the growth of Port au Prince to the rank of a primate city.

The Failure of Decentralization and Regional
Development Policies in the Third World and in Haiti
The negative impacts of urban primacy on development have become a major concern for
development planners in Third World countries and in Haiti. This concern has created the
emergence of dual function development policies that aimed to improve sectors of the economy and
social services (health or education) while at the same time integrating geographic dimensions into
the policies (Rondinelli 1983; Doan 1995; Glaeser 1999; Bardhan Automn 2002). At the same time,
decentralization policies have become increasingly popular in matters of governance all around the
world and in Third World countries in particular (Olowu 2001; Bardhan Automn 2002).
Definition of Decentralization
There are several definitions of decentralization. One of the best general definitions is
provided by Rondinelli, et al.: “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and
resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central government
ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public
authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs/PVOs.”
(Rondinelli 1981). In addition, Wolman (in Bennet, 1990) identifies types of decentralization: political
decentralization, administrative decentralization, and economic decentralization. For the purposes of the study,
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the concern is economic decentralization. Political and administrative decentralizations are not
successfully being applied in Haiti and are at the forefront of the debate surrounding
decentralization. Economic decentralization is put on the back burner, but as the literature review
will show, economic decentralization is necessary for the successful implementation of political and
administrative decentralizations.
Decentralization, Democracy and Poverty Reduction in the
Developing World
Decentralization has been experimented with throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America
(Rondinelli 1983; Burki 1999; World-Bank 2000). 5 The enthusiasm for decentralization found its
roots in the continued failure of centralized states to induce development and reduce poverty
because of corruption and the heaviness of the administrative structure. Decentralization works to
fragment and reduce the authority of the central government by transferring some of it to local
institutions that are administrated by locally elected officials. This new framework of power should
make local governments closer to their constituency and more accountable in the delivery of public
services. Progress in technology should also make it easier to locally manage services such as
electricity or communication. Finally, the smaller size of the territory to manage requires smaller, and
therefore more efficient, administrative structures (Wolcott 1994; Asthana 2003; Andrianova 2004;
Fjeldstad 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Decentralization should reduce poverty in
developing countries by improving governance and accountability (Loquai, Bah et al. 2001; Crook
2003; Schneider and University of Sussex. Institute of Development Studies. 2003)).

5

Decentralization has several definitions and can take different forms. In this study, I refer to the “devolution of political decision making to local level
smaller entities” (Bardhan, p.186)
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The Need for Economic Decentralization and the Role of Secondary
Cities
However, in spite of its promises, decentralization policies have so far failed to deliver
tangible spatial and governance results: both urban primacy and poverty are increasing in most
developing countries. Central governments do not have the capacity (or sometimes the political will)
to implement decentralization, and the local administrations do not have the sustainable capacity to
undertake the new responsibilities that come with decentralization.
Some scholars explain the failures of decentralization by citing the lack by the lack of
economic decentralization policy and more specifically the lack of secondary cities, which are cities
that are large enough to perform important economic and social functions for their own populations
and those in surrounding areas (Rondinelli 1983). In other words, a city that will be able to diffuse
development at a regional level, attract and retain rural migrants, and slow the growth of the primate
city. Secondary cities are crucial to the development of developing countries because of the roles
that they can play, such as reducing urban concentration, reversing polarization, alleviating problems
in larger cities, reducing regional inequities, stimulating rural economies, reducing urban poverty, and
increasing productivity (Rondinelli 1983). Secondary cities are therefore crucial to slowing the
growth of primate cities and reducing poverty in rural areas. Decentralization policies may fail
because of the lack of secondary cities that can support economic activities requiring high
population thresholds and extensive services and facilities (Rondinelli 1983). The present study has
identified, among the regional capitals, the secondary cities or regional growth poles that need to be
re-enforced in order to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process in Haiti.

The consequences of the primacy of the national capital Port au Prince over the national
economy has become a major concern for the Haitian government since 1986. Before 1986, the
Duvalier dictatorship wanted to control all aspects of the national life by maintaining a strong and
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highly centralized government and by concentrating all the socio-economic activities in the capital
Port au Prince. Since the end of the Duvaliers’ regime in 1986, there have been several policy efforts
to address them including the insertion of decentralization as one of the most important innovations
of the 1987 Haitian constitution. This innovation in the constitution aimed at decentralizing the
central government and to give more power to existing and newly created sub-national institutions.
In addition, there have been several attempts to reopen some of the regional ports to
international trade. These efforts were aimed at diverting trade traffic away from the port of Port-auPrince and decreasing congestion in the port. They have been successful in some places and
unsuccessful in others. For instance, the ports of Cap Haïtien, Saint Marc, Jacmel, and Miragoane
were rehabilitated for that purpose. These attempts were parts of ongoing efforts to address the
consequences of the primacy of Port au Prince and to implement a broader decentralization policy
by encouraging the delocalization of economic activities outside of the MAPAP. However, much
remains to be done to halt the growth of the MAPAP.
Like in Haiti, decentralization policies have been implemented in the Third World in part to
address the consequences of urban primacy. The assessment of the outcomes of decentralization
policies in Third World countries has given birth to a flourishing literature. Most research focuses on
administrative performance in resource management and service delivery in the areas of education,
water and sanitation or health care for instance (Ferrer, Alvarez et al. 2002; Asthana 2003; Larson
2003; Mønnesland 2003; PAD 2003). Unfortunately, the research / evaluation focuses on how the
policy as a whole is carried out by the central government and not on the performance of specific
local collectivities. In addition, when such studies are conducted, it is to assess the performance of
the particular local entities being studied and not to, eventually, draw conclusions between their
characteristics (population size, economic potentials, and so on) and the outcomes of
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decentralization. More importantly, decentralization outcomes have very rarely been studied from a
geographic standpoint with an emphasis on the urban system.
The focus on local governance and the performance of local institutions is unfortunately also
predominant in the design phase of decentralization policies. The idea is also that in order to
promote democracy all citizens, all the local institutions should be treated equally and should be
awarded the same rights and powers (Fukasaku, Hausmann et al. 1998; Aspinall, Fealy et al. 2003;
Tvedten and Orre 2003; Jütting 2005). Therefore, there would often be little differentiation in status
based on fundamental differences in terms of wealth or real institutional capacity to promote local
development. The policies and literature surrounding them mainly focus on political and
administrative decentralizations.
However, as Rodinelli (1983) points out so clearly, to achieve the other goals of
decentralization, to promote development and reduce urban primacy, it is necessary to enable the
other cities to play a more active role in the economy; it is necessary to promote an urban policy that
will decrease the attraction of the primate city and increase the attraction of other cities in the system
(Bodineau 1995). In other worlds, economic decentralization is necessary to achieve political and
administrative decentralization. The development of smaller towns and cities stimulates rural
development by creating closer markets for primary staples (Bos 1965; Boudeville 1966; Boventer
1970). The dispersion of economic activities lowers the cost of products and the transfer of
innovative values from the cities to the countryside (Brown 1981). More importantly, the
development of secondary cities should be integrated into the policy design, considering the role
that they can play in increasing the chances of success of decentralization in Third World countries.
Finally, cities and more specifically secondary cities in developing countries concentrate an
important part of the national economic activities and the population. These economic and
demographic characteristics of cities make it easy to raise sufficient local taxes (that are already raised
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by the central government) to carry out the new responsibilities of local institutions. Insufficient
potential local taxes are often one of the main obstacles to decentralization (Fukasaku, Hausmann et
al. 1998; Aspinall, Fealy et al. 2003; Tvedten and Orre 2003; Jütting 2005)
This study will formulate policy recommendations to support Haiti’s efforts to implement
decentralization by focusing on the deconcentration of socioeconomic activities outside of the
Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (MAPAP). Strengthening of institutions alone is not sufficient
to ensure the success of the process. The existing literature on the decentralization process in Haiti
does not explore the wide range of possible explanations for the failure of the current
decentralization policy in Haiti and elsewhere. Additional explanations can be found in the fields of
regional and urban economies and general development.
Indeed, the lack of spatial economic policy to support decentralization can limit the impact
of the administrative measures enacted to improve local governance. Economic growth determines,
to a large extent, administrative capacities (Rondinelli 1983). Economic growth requires investments
that investors will seek to protect by participating in the local political life; it also requires skilled
human resources that will be likely to engage in local political activities. Therefore, economic growth
may provide the regions with qualified public servants. Moreover, economic growth increases local
fiscal assets and therefore, potential public investments in services and infrastructures. This study
has explored additional venues to explain the failure of the ongoing decentralization process and
offer the elements to design the spatial economic policy to support it and increase its chances of
success.
Spatial economic policies rely on the framework of the growth pole theory for their design
and evaluation. However, the application of the growth pole theory as a policy framework or to
evaluate decentralization and regional planning policies in the Third World has not been very
successful as described in the previous chapter. One of the reasons is the lack of data. This research
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takes advantage of a rare opportunity to test the growth pole theory in a Third World country. Very
often, the lack of data is the main obstacle to conducting research in the field of regional study in
developing countries (Rondinelli 1983). Fortunately, Haiti conducted its last census in 2003, more
than twenty years after the previous one. The Haitian Census Bureau made it its priority to collect a
very detailed set of information and to use the latest technologies available and usable in the Haitian
context. All the data collected is today in a computer database and technicians can run requests and
produce specific sub-datasets, like the one used for this study. Such detailed information is rarely
available in the developing world. This offers a unique opportunity to conduct research in urban and
regional studies and to realistically test the growth pole theory in a developing country. This study
will bring important missing elements to the field of regional studies in the Third World.

Growth Pole Theory and its Application as a Policy
Framework in the Third World
This chapter presents the application of the growth pole theory in the Third World on which
the identification of regional development poles relies. Regional development poles are usually cities
that are targeted to receive public and private investments in order to create jobs and socioeconomic
activities that will attract people who would otherwise migrate to the primate city. In this sense, the
regional development poles are designed to decrease the growth of the primate city.
The Growth Pole Theory
Perroux first introduced the notion of economic growth poles (Perroux 1955). Perroux
argued that a group of industries around a leading propulsive industry will innovate and grow faster
than those outside the group or pole. The propulsive industry will use inputs from smaller industries
or raw materials from the primary sector, boosting inter-economic activities and innovation rates to
meet its evolving needs and expansion. The concept of “dominance” was important in the context
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of economic growth pole. The flow of goods and services from the dominant, firm X to Y is a
greater proportion of X's output than the flow from Y to X is of Y's output.
This notion was later transferred to geographical space and broadened to include the
concentration of population and economic activities and named “growth pole”. Growth pole theory
is based on the work of Losch (Losch 1954; Christaller 1966; Von Thunen 1966). Chistaller and Von
Thunen have discussed how urban centers dominate and organize their surrounding area. The level
of domination and the effectiveness of such organization depend on the urban center’s position in a
hierarchical scheme. The larger an urban center is, the larger and better organized its dominating
territory will be. Von Thunen (1966) studied the influence of cities on the spatial organization of
agricultural production in Germany.
Several dependant industries might be geographically regrouped around the propulsive
industry, creating a polarized region around a regional (or growth) pole. A polarized region is
defined as a heterogeneous, continuous area localized in geographical space, centered around a
regional center of gravity and whose different parts are interdependent through mutual
complementary relation (Richardson 1975).
A regional pole is a set of expanding industries located in an urban area that induces the
development of economic activities throughout its zone of influence. The attraction power of a
pole increases with its size, and its effect decreases with distance; isolated industries will struggle
to grow. There is a push and pull factor that comes into play where the larger urban centers have
a stronger attraction power than the smaller cities. The larger cities also have a stronger ability to
retain their own population (Boudeville 1966). The assumptions of the effects of the size of the
poles, the size of the other cities in their regions, and the distance between the poles and the
other cities in their regions are tested in this study.
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The factors that explain a pole are not only economic but institutional and social, and the
effects of a pole have the same dimensions: “The growth pole is a set that has the capacity to induce
growth of another set (growth being defined as a lasting increase in the dimensional indicator); the
pole of development is one that has the capacity to engender economic and social structures whose
effects are to increase the complexity of the whole and increase its multi-dimensional return”
(Perroux 1988, page 49). Myrdal explains the overall development of the pole and its region by the
“cumulative causation” by which a change in a social system will “not call forth countervailing
changes but, instead, supporting changes which move the system in the same direction as the first
change but much further” (1957, p. 13). The development of a growth pole should induce not only
economic growth but the overall socioeconomic development (Hirschmann 1958).
In the case of this study, the analysis is extended to migration between the regional capitals
(the poles) and the other cities of their respective regions. The attraction power of a pole over its
region is measured by the number and percentage of migrants received. The strongest poles are
identified as the urban centers receiving the most migrants from a defined geographic entity. The
strongest poles also attract migrants even from the other large cities of their regions and from cities
that are far away. These assumptions and hypothesis are tested in this study.
Migration is a good proxy to study attraction power and the potential for economic growth.
Migrants are attracted by wage differentials between their place of origin and their destination.
However, unemployment rates are very high in cities across the country and wages are sometimes
lower than in rural areas. Expected wages differentials explain the increase in migration to urban
centers. (Todaro 1970; Todaro March 1969). Above all, migrants hope not only to find better paid
employment in the formal sector but also to take advantage of all the economic opportunities in the
informal sector and services, retail activities for a growing population as well as subcontractors for
larger enterprises in the formal sector (Andrei 1982; Andrei Rogers 1982; IHSI 2001). The
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destination is the city with the most potential to fulfill the migrants’ dreams. Migration is therefore a
good proxy to study the attraction power of potential growth poles.
The Application of the Growth Pole Theory as a Policy Framework
in the Third World and in Haiti
Growth pole theory not only explains the existing poles but also opens the doors for its
applications in formulating regional policy. Regional and urban planners started to use growth pole
theory in order to design spatial economic policies to reduce the growth of primate cities by
stimulating regional poles (Richardson 1975). Unfortunately, the strict application of the geographic
assumptions of growth pole theory in Third World countries did not produce the expected results.
Indeed, instead of promoting regional development, regional planned or natural poles tend to
function like enclaves. The main causes identified are the high concentration of economic activities
and administrative and managerial resources in primate cities, which is very difficult to reverse; the
geographic isolation of the potential growth poles in their regions; the weaknesses of the policies;
regime changes; and the lack of political will (Jefferson 1939; Linsky 1965; Coraggio 1972; Coraggio
1973).
Additional explanations of the failure of the application of the growth pole theory in
developing countries are provided by comparing the urbanization process in the First World to that
of the Third World. The theory was originally formulated in the European context, which is
completely different from that of today’s Third World countries. Indeed, in Europe, urbanization
was the combined product of agricultural modernization and industrialization. In the developing
countries, a combination of overpopulation, of poverty and persistence of traditional agriculture in
the rural area and limited industrial development explains urban growth. Moreover, the relationship
between the different sectors of the economy is also different. While in the First World the primary
sector produced raw material for the development of industrial activities, the primary sector of
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industry in the Third World (mainly agriculture) produces raw materials almost exclusively for the
external market. The raw materials produced are not used to develop industrial activities and
produce value-added goods.
Above all, it is very difficult to accurately assess the uses of growth pole theory as a planning
strategy in the Third World because an important part of the results can be explained by factors that
are external to the theory itself, such as the policy implementation process. It is also difficult to test
the assumptions of the theory in Third World countries because of the lack of detailed data. More
research needs to be conducted to fairly assess the growth pole theory as a policy framework in the
Third World context. The present study has filled part of this gap in the literature.
The spatial assumptions of growth pole theory are based on the linkage between rural and
urban economies; this linkage supports the process through which urban centers will propel
development in their hinterland and where urban centers will grow based on the wealth of their
hinterland. Unfortunately, this linkage is broken in developing countries because the international
market plays a key role in Third World countries’ economic activities.
There is no existing study of the Haitian urban system or about the test or application of
growth pole theory. The latest government national development program does not have a
comprehensive approach to address the problems raised by the high level of primacy of the
MAPAP. In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation published the National
Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document (NSGPRD) for 2008 – 2010. This document
presents the government’s and other stakeholders’ proposed interventions in the country for this
period. It was elaborated based on a participative approach promoted by the World Bank in
developing countries. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) usually provides the
necessary technical assistance as it was the case in Haiti (MPCE November 2007).
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Although urban development is mentioned several times in the document, there is no overall
urban development program/activities that will address the problems raised by this study. The first
mention of urbanization appears on page 92 under the section “Specific cross-sector and transversal
policies,” ”Environment and sustainable development” in the chapter named “The poor and out-of-control
urbanization.” The section deals mainly with favoring urbanization outside of environmentally
sensible areas like swamps, river basins or steep slopes.
The second mention appears under the chapter “State Capacity building” in the section
“Decentralization” on page 98. The activities mainly focus on the training of the local elected
officials and the staff of the local collectivities, reforming the legal framework, advocacy to explain
the advantages and challenges of decentralization and, capacity building.
Urban development re-appears on page 100 as a section in the chapter “Specific cross-sector
and transversal policies.” This section focuses on how to restore order in the poor neighborhoods
by rebuilding the physical environment, creating jobs, re-establishing the presence of the local and
central authorities, increasing the capacity of the local authorities in terms of slum management and
promoting participative neighborhood planning. Finally, the section “Land Management” of the
chapter “Specific cross-sector and transversal policies” aims at promoting relationship between the
urban and rural areas at the regional, arrondissement and communal levels.
These proposed actions do not address the problems raised by this study, mainly how to
slow the growth of the MAPAP and build a balanced urban system. The present study provides the
rational for including a more integrated urban development strategy approach at the national level.
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Research Design
General Considerations
One of the objectives of the study is to identify potential growth poles among the regional
capitals. The poles should be reinforced with important public investments in infrastructure that will
make them as attractive to private investors than MAPAP. In addition, private investments should
be promoted by measures such as tax exemptions or other financial incentives.
I wanted to focus on decentralization at the national level and draw comparisons and
conclusions that will provide me with the elements to formulate policy recommendations that will
promote economic decentralization and halt the growth of MAPAP. In a developing country like
Haiti, consistent data collection is not a priority and there are very few complete sets of data on the
eight regional capitals. Because of these considerations, I have primarily used data that are available
for the eight regional capitals, while other data are used to explain the results and findings.

The Case Study Design
To conduct this research, I have used the case study design, Haiti being the case. The
research has several characteristics that justify this choice. Urban growth in the context of regional
migration and economic dependency is a complex, contemporary phenomenon in which the
boundaries among the different factors are not always clear (Yin 2003). For instance, the location of
a city in a region with export-oriented agricultural activity will not induce population growth if this
city is not a port-city (public or private investments) or if it is not at a crossroad of the
transportation of the goods to their gateway.
The topic to be investigated and the theoretical framework to be used are complex and
require a flexible strategy to integrate several scientific fields and a variety of types and sources of
data. Assessing the role of the departmental capitals in their regions requires elements and
techniques from geography, economics, and demography. I also use qualitative, quantitative, and
geographic data from all these disciplines. The case study strategy gives the flexibility to navigate
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among different tools, techniques, and data in a mixed methodology approach (Singleton 1998;
Creswell 2003; Yin 2003).
The research is an explanatory case study in the sense that the objective is to understand how
the different factors explain population growth in the units of analysis. At the same time, the factors
cannot be manipulated, which makes an experiment impossible to conduct in this context (Yin
2003).
Haiti, the case, is not meant to be representative of the Third World; rather the growth pole
and dependency theories are used as templates to understand the population growth in the units of
analysis, the regional capitals. The findings of the study will serve as an empirical test of the theory
and will lead to “analytical generalization” of the theoretical propositions and hypotheses (Yin 2003).

Units of Analysis
Units of analysis are the primary entity to be studied. They can be an individual, an event, or
an entity. In a case study design, the “definition of the unit of analysis (…) is related to the way the
initial research questions have been defined” (Yin 1994). In addition, there are many ways to select
the units of analysis in the field of regional study. The parameters vary from political, administrative,
economic or military functions to demographic characteristics (Ullman 1941; Boventer 1970;
Coraggio 1973; Richardson 1975; Rondinelli 1983). In our case, the criterion is administrative. The
primary units of analysis are: Gonaives, Cap Haïtien, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté, Hinche, Jacmel, Les
Cayes, and Jérémie (map 2). They are the regional capitals of Haiti and as such, have a leadership
role to play in promoting the development of their respective region and share common political
and administrative characteristics. The selection of the regional capitals as primary units of analysis is
related to the main objective of the study, which is to identify and explain growth poles/secondary
cities in Haiti.
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The following map shows the boundaries of the nine departments of Haiti and the location
of the capitals. Only eight departments and their capitals, the potential regional poles, are studied in
this research. The capital of the West department is Port-au-Prince, the national capital, which along
with its surrounding cities forms MAPAP, the primate city (Map 2).
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Map 2: The departments of Haiti and their capitals
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The regional capitals are different in terms of demographic characteristics (table 4,
appendixes 1 and 2). The populations of the capitals vary, from 16,625 inhabitants for the city of
Fort Liberté in the North East, to 204,058 for Cap Haïtien in the North. The average population of
83,176 and the standard deviation of 63,911 show important variations in the size of the cities. The
urban populations of the departments show the same disparities: it varies from 59,642 for South
East to 626,928 for Grande Anse. The sizes of the regional capitals and of the urban population are
determining factors in the attraction power of a city. Consequently, these disparities in population
should result in disparities in the attraction power and migration patterns.
Table 4: Urban and rural populations of the eight departments and the population of their capitals
Department Total population Rural population Urban population
Capital
North
823,043
497,725
325,318 Cap-Haïtien
North East
308,385
190,513
117,872 Fort-Liberté
South East
484,675
425,033
59,642 Jacmel
Center
581,505
486,886
94,619 Hinche
Grande Anse
522,153
104,775
626,928 Jérémie
North West
531,198
412,400
118,798 Port-de-Paix
South
621,651
512,028
109,623 Les Cayes
Artibonite
1,299,398
876,922
422,476 Gonaïves
Minimum
308,385
104,775
59,642
Maximum
1,299,398
876,922
626,928
Average
646,501
438,285
234,410
Standard
deviation
280,969
217,141
190,495
Source : IHSI–RGPH –2003

Capital Population
204,058
16,625
30,183
24,131
103,889
70,742
55,276
160,501
16,625
204,058
83,176
63,911

The Data
This study will rely on different types and sources of secondary data that are both
quantitative and qualitative. I have primarily used data that are available for all the units of analysis.
This approach was necessary to be able to compare the results and draw conclusions that are
essential to formulating recommendations to implement economic decentralization. For each type of
data, I have presented the rationale behind the choice as well as the limitations of using such data.
The data are processed to conduct statistical analysis and test the research questions and hypothesis.
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Rarely Available Census Data
The 2003 Census Data
New census data are rarely available in a developing country like Haiti. In 2003, Haiti held its
first census in 20 years. During the 2003 Census, the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Computer
Science (IHSI) sent interviewers all over the country with questionnaires to be completed for each
dwelling unit. Among the questions, the interviewers asked each person in the dwelling unit their
birthplace and whether or not it is in a rural or urban area. People whose birthplace is different from
their place of residence are considered migrants for the purpose of this study.
IHSI created a matrix for each department that provides, for each commune, the total
population, number of natives (persons whose birthplace is the same as the place of residence), and
number of migrants (persons whose birthplace is different from the place of residence). For the
number of migrants born in another commune of the same department, the matrix gives the name
of the birth commune and states whether it is an urban or rural area (table 5). For the purpose of
this study, I am going to use the number of migrants from one city to another (persons born in an a
city and living in a different city); I will refer to these numbers as “urban-to-urban migrants.” I will
use primarily the number of urban-to-urban migrants between each unit of analysis (the regional
capitals of the eight departments of the country – except for the department of the West where
MAPAP is located) and the cities of their respective departments. I will use the other data to
support, illustrate and re-enforce my findings.
Table 5: Matrix of migration data from the same department

Residence place

Commune 1
Urban Rural

Commune 2
Urban Rural

Commune 1
Urban
Rural
Commune 2
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Birthplace
Commune 3
Urban
Rural

Commune 3
Urban Rural

Commune N
Urban Rural

Urban
Rural
Commune N

Relevance of Demographic and Migration Data
Demographic and migration data are very relevant for studying and identifying development
poles in Third World countries. Natural growth alone cannot account for the rapid urban population
growth. Natural population growth in an urban setting is lower since fertility rates are lower than
those in rural areas: rural dwellers tend to be more educated, modern and to have less children than
their rural counterparts. Therefore, migration plays an important role in urban population growth in
developing countries. However, migrants are mainly young adults at the peak of their fertility who
are most likely to have children, which should also contribute to urban growth. In this sense,
migration contributes in two different ways to urban growth (Todaro 1979).
Migration is also a good proxy to study attraction power and the potential for economic
growth. Migrants are attracted by wage differentials between their place of origin and their
destination. However, unemployment rates are very high in cities across the country and wages are
sometimes lower than in rural areas. Expected wages differentials explain the increase in migration to
urban centers. (Todaro 1970; Todaro March 1969). Above all, migrants hope not only to find better
paid employment in the formal sector but also to take advantage of all the economic opportunities
in the informal sector and services, retail activities for a growing population as well as subcontractors
for larger enterprises in the formal sector (Andrei 1982; Andrei Rogers 1982; IHSI 2001). The
destination is the city with the most potential to fulfill the migrants’ dreams. Migration is therefore a
good proxy to identify potential growth poles.
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Limitations of the Census Data
Unfortunately there are no data on the number of people who migrate from one regional
capital to another. This information would have been useful to measure the ability of the capitals to
retain their migrants or natives or their ability to attract migrants from the other capitals; in other
words, the competitiveness within the national urban system. However, one can still know, for each
city, the number of total migrants from every other department (table 6).
Table 6: Matrix of migration data from the other departments and overseas

Residence place

Department of
West

Department of
North

Birthplace
Department of
N1

Department of
N2

Foreign

Commune 1
Urban
Rural
Commune 2
Urban
Rural

Finally, the data do not include the temporal aspect of migration, i.e., date of migration. This
information would have allowed me to analyze trends in migration patterns over the course of
several years. Instead, the data provide just a “snapshot” for the year 2003, which still provides a
good proxy of migration trends.
Geographic Data
The geographic data include numeric data (the distances between cities) and vector spatial
data such as land use, topography, hydrology, and road maps. In addition, the census data described
above are integrated in a geographic information system (GIS) and linked to geographic features
such as the cities’ location. The numeric data are used to study the effect of distance on the number
of migrants.
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Economic Data
I will use quantitative and qualitative secondary economic data. A first set of data is the
value, in gourdes (the Haitian currency), of import taxes collected at each of the tax collection
points in the country. Data pertaining to exports do not exist because Haiti does not collect taxes on
exports as part of the requirement of the Structural Adjustment Program mandated by IMF. These
data are used to assess the impact of the international market on these cities and are published by
the Ministry of Finances (table 12).
The amount of import taxes collected at each tax collection point reflects the volume of
international trade handled. A greater level of import taxes is a sign of stronger ties with the
international market. These data are used to test the assumptions of dependency theory that cities
with stronger ties with the international market tends to attract more migrants.
Data regarding the total value of goods imported–exported are only available at the national
level and not by trade locations. Data on the private sector/employment for all the regional capitals
are not available in a country where 68% of non-agricultural activities function in the informal
sector. However, for the fiscal year of 2008–2009, for example, the Haitian GDP was 14,015 million
gourdes while the value of imports was 18,317; the value of exports was 4,312 million gourdes (BRH
2010). These data show that Haiti imports more goods than it produces and that the value of
exports is minimal compared to the value of imports. Data on imports provide a good estimation of
international trade activities in the regional capitals.
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Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Data Processing
The main objectives of the study are:


To identify among the regional capitals the cities that have the characteristics to be
potential “growth poles” or “secondary cities.”



To explain how these cities differ from the other regional capitals and from the other
cities (except the cities of the MAPAP).



To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order
to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce the
negative consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve
the NSGPRD.

The objectives of this study are reached by answering six research questions and testing six
hypotheses. The questions are formulated to take full advantage of the available data and use them
to identify the growth poles and explain the factors that differentiate them from the other cities. By
identifying and explaining the most attractive poles, I have reached two of the main objectives of the
study. In addition, by reaching the first two objectives, I gathered elements to reach the third
objective, i.e., to formulate policy recommendations to strengthen their attraction, which will enable
them to attract migrants who would otherwise go to the MAPAP. Because I used the growth pole
and dependency theories as frameworks, the study also tests some of their hypotheses.
The data processing includes basic statistical analysis and the mapping of the data to test the
hypotheses of the growth pole theory and dependency theory and visualize complex migration
patterns.
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Identification of the Poles
The first three research questions identify the strongest growth poles among the eight
regional capitals by testing hypotheses pertaining to urban primacy and growth pole theory. With
these questions, I will identify the regional capitals that have the stronger attraction power expressed
by their ability to attract 1) the largest number of migrants to their departments compared to the
MAPAP, 2) the largest substantial number and percentage of cities that have a certain population
size and, 3) the largest substantial number and percentage of migrants from cities that are far away
within their departments. The regional capitals with the strongest attraction power are the preferred
locations to concentrate public investments, promote private investments and, relocated socioeconomic activities from the MAPAP. The availability of jobs and socio-economic infrastructure will
strengthen their already strong attraction power and they will be able to attract migrants that would
otherwise go to the MAPAP.
Question 1: How does the urban primacy of the MAPAP affect the attraction power of the
regional capitals?
Hypothesis 1: The MAPAP receives more migrants from the regions than the corresponding
regional capitals and the number of migrants to the MAPAP decreases when the distance between
the MAPAP and the regional capitals increase
This first question tests the main assumption of the primate city concept that the primate
city overwhelmingly dominates all the socio-economic activities of the country (Jefferson 1939). As a
primate city, the MAPAP should attract more migrants from anywhere in the country than the
regional capitals. At the same time, this question tests the growth pole theory hypothesis that such
domination decreases when the distance increases (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966).
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To answer research question 1 and test hypothesis 1, I have computed the ratio of the total
number of migrants from each department living in the MAPAP to the total number of migrants of
the same department living in the regional capital.
Ratio = Number of migrants from department X living in its regional capital
Number of migrants from department X living in the MAPAP
The regional capitals with the smallest ratio are the strongest poles at the national level
where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP; it is where public and private
investments in infrastructure, social services and job creation activities should be concentrated and
promoted.
Question 2: How does the population size of the cities of origin explain the share of
migrants?
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of migrants out decreases when the size of the cities
of origin increases.

Question 2 and hypothesis 2 test the assumption of growth pole theory that the larger cities
have a stronger attraction power and have the capacity to retain their population (Von Thunen
1966). In reverse, small cities have limited attraction power and their population tends to migrate to
larger cities. It is a sign of strong attraction power for a regional capital to attract migrants from large
cities within region.
To answer research question 2 and test hypothesis 2, I have built the following table for each
department (table 7, appendix 3):
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Table 7: Example of the tables used to answer to Q2 and H2: Department of Artibonite: population and
number of migrants sent to the regional capital by city of origin

Cities of origin

Population

Anse Rouge

Number of migrants
sent to the regional
capital

8,867

749

Desdunes

18,970

516

Dessalines

18,224

321

Ennery

3,132

248

Estère

13,046

286

2,824

118

Gros Morne

21,207

942

La Chapelle

3,665

0

Marmelade

5,355

142

Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite

27,012

59

Saint Marc

90,382

167

Saint Michel de l'Attalaye

21,458

277

906

898

26,927

50

Grande Saline

Terre Neuve
Verrettes

Source, Haitian Institute for Statistics and Informatics (IHSI)-RGPH 2003

Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants and
the size of their cities of origin:

Where:
Xi = the number of migrants sent to the regional capital by city of origin i
Yi = the population of city of origin i
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively
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r : the correlation between the size of the city of origin and the number of migrants sent to
the regional capital.
The regional capitals that do not support this hypothesis are the strongest poles, i.e., they
attract migrants even from large cities that should have the ability to retain their own population.
This is where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP and where public
investments should be concentrated and private investments promoted.
Question 3: How does the distance between the cities of origin and the destination
(regional capital) affect the number of migrants?
Hypothesis 3: The number of migrants decreases as the distance increases.
Question 3 and test hypothesis 3 test the assumption of growth pole theory that the
influence of the larger cities decreases when distance increase (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966).
To answer research question 3 and test hypothesis 3, I have built the following table for each
department (table 8, appendix 4):
Table 8: Example of the tables used to answer to Q3 and H3: Department of Artibonite: number of migrants
sent to the regional capital by city of origin and distance between the regional capital and each city of origin

Cities of origin

Number of
migrants

Distance from the
regional capital

Anse Rouge

749

32.79

Desdunes

516

20.2

Dessalines

321

20.24

Ennery

248

18.39

Estère

286

15.16

Grande Saline

118

33.47

Gros Morne

942

18.45

La Chapelle

0

59.29

Marmelade

142

32.8

59

37.61

Saint Marc

167

33.88

Saint Michel de l'Attalaye

277

34.26

Terre Neuve

898

17.76

50

44.15

Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite

Verrettes
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Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003
Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants
received by the regional capital and the distance to the regional capital from each city of origin.

Where:
Xi = the number of migrants received by the regional capital i
Yi = the distance of city i from the regional capital
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively
r : the correlation between the number of migrants from each city of origin and the distance
between each city of origin and the regional capital.
The regional capitals that do not support this hypothesis are the strongest poles i.e. they
attract migrants from cities that are located far away, which illustrates the geographic extent of their
attraction power. This is where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP and
where public investments should be concentrated and private investments promoted.

These three questions combined will help identify the strongest regional poles. I have
constructed an index with the results to these three questions. For each question, a number from 1
(weakest) to 8 (strongest) is assigned to each regional capital. The number is the rank of each
regional capital among the 8 regional capitals. These numbers are added up for each capital to
identify the overall strongest to the weakest poles.
Strength of a regional capital/pole = rank1 + rank 2 + rank 3
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Where:
Rank 1= rank for the answer to Q1/H1
Rank 2= rank for the answer to Q2/H2
Rank 3= rank for the answer to Q3/H3
Explanation of the Attraction Power of the Strongest Poles
The fourth, fifth, and sixth questions explain the attraction power of the strongest poles by
testing the assumptions of growth pole and dependency theories and the assumptions of the
concept of urban primacy, namely the effect of the MAPAP, the effect of the distance between the
MAPAP and the regional capitals on the impact of the primate city, the size of the regional capital
and the links with the international market expressed. The links to the international market is
measured by the amount of local import taxes collected. The strategic location and the infrastructure
provide an interface with the international market. The amount of taxes shows the presence of a
private sector taking advantage of this interface.
Question 4: How does the distance of the regional capital from the MAPAP explain
the number of migrants in the regional capitals?
Hypothesis 4: The number of migrants to the regional capitals increases when the
distance between the MAPAP and the regional capital increases
Question 4 and Hypothesis 4 test the assumptions of the primate city concept that the
primate city will dominate the entire urban system (Jefferson 1939); such domination extends to all
socioeconomic activities including migration. They also test the growth pole theory hypothesis that
the influence of a large city, in this case the MAPAP will decrease when the distance increases
(Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966).
To answer research question 4 and test hypothesis 4, I have built the following table (table
9):
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Table 9: Distance to the MAPAP and number of migrants received by regional capital

Regional Capital
Cap Haitien
Fort Liberte
Gonaives
Hinche
Jacmel
Jeremie
Les Cayes
Port de Paix

Number of urbanDistance from to-urban migrants
received
the MAPAP
203.35
44,470
243.95
2,098
151.98
24,702
115.96
1,941
80.43
2,357
286.52
3,359
190.74
10,590
228.50
14,686

Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003
Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants
received by the regional capital and the distance of each regional capital to the MAPAP.

Where:
Xi = the number of urban-to-urban migrants received by regional capital i
Yi = the distance between regional capital i and the MAPAP
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively
r : the correlation between the number of urban-to-urban migrants received by each regional
capital and the distance between each regional capital and the MAPAP.
If the data support the hypothesis, concentrating the public investments and promoting
private investments in the furthest regional capitals will have the fastest impact in attracting a larger
number of migrants to those capitals.
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Question 5: How does the size of the regional capitals explain the number of
migrants?
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of migrants to the regional capitals increases with the
size of the population of the regional capitals

To answer research question 5 and test hypothesis 5, I have built the following table (Table
10).
Table 10: Population and number of migrants received by regional capital

Regional Capital
Cap Haitien
Fort Liberte
Gonaives
Hinche
Jacmel
Jeremie
Les Cayes
Port de Paix

Population
204,058
16,625
160,501
24,131
30,183
33,829
55,276
70,742

Number of
migrants received
44,470
2,098
24,702
1,941
2,357
3,359
10,590
14,686

Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003

Then, I computed the coefficient of correlation between the total population of the capitals
and the number of migrants received and the coefficient of correlation between the percentage of
the total urban population of the department represented by the regional capitals and the percentage
of migrants in the capitals.

Where:
Xi = the number of migrants received by regional capital
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Yi = the population of regional capital i
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively
r : the correlation between the size of the regional capital and the number of migrants
received.
Question 5 and hypothesis 5 test the growth pole theory hypothesis that the attraction
power of a city increases with its size (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). If the data support the
hypothesis, concentrating the public investments and promoting private investments in the largest
regional capital will have the fastest impact in attracting a larger number of migrants to those
capitals.

Question 6: How does the dependency of the economy affect the migration patterns
in urban centers?
Hypothesis 6: The amount of import taxes collected is higher in the strongest
regional capitals.
The amount of import taxes collected is used as a proxy to measure the ability of the local
population to take advantage of economic opportunities linked to the international market available
because of the location of the regional capitals. This question tests the hypothesis that, outside of
the primate cities, other cities in the Caribbean including Haiti, cities with economic activities linked
to the international market tend to grow faster (Portes 1989; Portes 1994; Portes 1997).
To answer research question 6 and test hypothesis 6, I have built the following table (Table
11).
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Table 11: Amount of import taxes collected and number of migrants received
Cities

Total import taxes in gourdes

Number of migrants

Gonaives

75,639,219.34

Cap Haitien

157,897,655.24

4,773
16,050

Miragoane

108,607,104.60

296

Port de Paix

26,987,838.37

4,998

Saint Marc

90,153,466.86

1,896

Ouanaminthe

11,736,285.58

1,513

Jacmel

970,227.32

710

Cayes

4,813,272.58

2,842

698,645.53

1,384

Belladère

1,300,239.36

225

Fort Liberté

2,099,326.24

827

Anse à Pîtres

34,919.53

839

Jérémie

Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003 and BRH

Then, I have computed the coefficient of correlation between the number and percentage of
migrants received by the regional capitals and the amount of taxes collected.

Where:
Xi = the number of migrants received by regional capital i
Yi = the amount of import taxes collected in regional capital i
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively
r : the correlation between the total amount of import taxes in gourdes collected in each
regional capital and the number of migrants received.
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The dynamism of the local private sector will increase the return on the public investments
and attract new private investments in a multiplying effect. It may be necessary to energize the
private sector in places where it is less dynamic.

Mapping Methodology to Illustrate the Migration
Patterns at the Regional Level
The Geographical Information System (GIS) software MapInfo 5.0 was used to create maps
for this study. GIS is a powerful tool that can be used to display and visualize otherwise complicated
geographic data and trends. The data used for this research are geographic (location of the cities and
distance) and demographic (population of the cities, number of migrants). The phenomena being
studied are both spatially static (population and distance) and dynamic (migration flows); they
interact to explain the migration patterns at the regional level. Mapping the data allows for the
visualization of complex patterns and helps illustrate the tables.
The migration maps are created following a three-step process, with one map for each
region. A map is created with the population data in a first step, and with the migration data in a
second step. In the third step, both maps are combined to provide a complete picture of migration
patterns in relation to the size of the city of origin and the size of the regional capitals, the relative
location of the cities, and their distance to the regional capitals.
The maps are used to illustrate the findings and describe and illustrate identified geographic
migration patterns.
Step 1: Urban population map
The urban population map has the following layers:
•

A map with the limits of the communes

•

A map with the location of the chef-lieux of communes (capital/principal city),
including the regional capital to which are annexed population data
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A first map is created with these two layers. In the background it contains the limits of the
communes. On top of this layer is overlaid a thematic layer: each city is represented by a round
symbol, the size of which is proportional to its population size.
Mapping these data projects the cities in the geographic space: The cities are no longer
separate entities but are located in relationship to each other. More importantly, the cities are located
in relation to the regional capital.
In addition, the proportional size symbols allow the reader to visualize where the largest or
smallest cities are located and their relative distance to the regional capital. The reading of the map
will help identify geographic patterns and answer questions: for example, are the largest cities further
away from the regional capital or are they closer? In other words, does distance from the regional
capital affect the size of the cities of origin?
Step 2: Mapping the migration data
The second step is the mapping of migration data: the number of migrants between each city
of origin and the regional capital. The layer used in this step is created using Map Info’s “spider” tool.
Spider works by using two layers of point features; the first must contain the destination point and
the second the origin point. The spider tool creates a series of lines feature that links each origin to
one destination, creating a spider web design, hence the name. The created lines are saved in a new
layer and constitute new geographic line objects/features to which attribute data can be added.
For the purposes of this research, the first layer of the destination feature point contains the
regional capitals. The second layer of the origin feature points contains the other cities of the
department. The lines link each city of origin to the regional capital. The data added to the lines
features are the number of migrants from each city of origin to the regional capital. The migration
data are represented by the width of each line.
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Step 3: Building the final map: mapping the migration patterns
The final step of the mapping process is putting together the final maps. The maps created
during the two previous steps are overlaid; with the population maps at the bottom of the pile and
the migration data on top. The resulting maps provide at the same time the visualization of the
population and migration data projected in the geographic space. This combination provides a
picture of the effects of distance, location, size of the cities of origin, and size of the regional capitals
on the number of migrants.
The final maps provide a visual test of the growth theory and dependency theory
hypotheses. Are the migrants coming mainly from the smallest cities? Are they coming mainly from
the closest cities? Do cities located in strategic areas with economic ties to the international market
attract more migrants?
The mapping of migration data using the spider tool projects these data into the geographic
space. By doing so, it also provides a visualization of geographic migration patterns: the geographic
origin of the migrants, their destination, the distance between the two, their relative location to each
other, and the significance of the migration flows. This image helps identify geographic trends and
provides a visual answer to the research questions.
In addition, topographic, hydrographic, and road data will be placed as layers over the
demographic maps; allowing one to investigate whether factors such as natural barriers, sub-regional
geographic entities, or transportation networks can also provide additional explanations of the
results.
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Results and Findings
In this chapter, I present the results to each of the research questions and hypothesis and the
implications of those results for the growth pole and dependency theories and, for the objectives of
the research.

The Regional Capitals: Primary Destinations for Urbanto-Urban Migrants of their Respective Department
It is important to assess whether the regional capitals are also the regional poles of their
respective departments. If they are all regional poles, this will decrease the significance of one of the
limitations of this study, the selection criteria of the units of analysis based on administrative status.
This assessment is made by comparing, for each department, the percentage of urban-to-urban
migrants received by the regional capitals versus the percentage received by the other cities of the
same region or elsewhere. The percentage of migrants in each city’s population will also be
compared.
The data show that the regional capitals stand out as regional attraction poles in their
respective urban system: they are the primary destination for urban-to-urban migrants of their
department. On average, the department capitals receive 54.61% of the migrants from their
respective regions. Comparatively, the other cities attract only an average of 3.79% of the urban-tourban migrants—an average that is 14.41 times less than the capitals. The standard deviation of
25.67 shows important differences among the capitals for which the percentage varies from 20.67%
for Fort Liberté to 91.12% for Cap Haïtien. Although there are important differences among the
percentage of migrants received by each capital, they all attract a substantially higher percentage of
migrants than the other cities of their respective department (table 12; figure 4).
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Table 12: Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants by place of residence by department

Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants
by place of residence

Department
South
Grande Anse
North
Center
South East
North West
Artibonite
North East
Minimum
Maximum
National Average
Standard Deviation

Capitals
5.14
4.09
7.87
2.15
2.35
7.07
2.97
4.97
2.15
7.07
5.73
2.19

Average
Percentage
Ratio
of
Department
2.25
2.29
2.44
1.68
2.73
2.88
1.59
1.36
3.47
0.68
2.64
2.68
1.26
2.36
2.56
1.94
1.26
0.68
3.47
2.36
2.37
1.98
0.69

Percentage of urban-to-urban
migrants received by place of
residence
Average
Percentage Percentage
Ratio
Capitals
of
Department
69.64
1.86
37.44
48.07
3.05
15.76
91.12
0.49
185.96
33.35
6.05
5.51
32.96
7.44
4.43
85.21
1.64
51.96
55.86
3.15
17.73
20.67
6.61
3.13
20.67
0.49
3.17
91.12
7.44
185.96
68.58
4.78
40.24
28.08
2.80

Figure 4: Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants by regional capitals and the other cities by department
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The percentage of migrants in the population of the capitals also remains modest. The
average percentage of migrants in the total population of the regional capital is 4.58%. This number
varies from 2.15% for the city of Hinche to 7.87% for Cap Haïtien. A standard deviation of 2.11
shows a homogenous group. Despite these low numbers, the regional capitals have an average of
approximately twice (1.98) the percentage of migrants than the other cities in their own departments.
Except for the city of Jacmel in the South East department, all the capitals have a higher percentage
of migrants than other cities in their department (table 12; figure 5).
Figure 5: Presence of urban-to-urban migrants in cities
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All the regional capitals are poles in their respective region when it comes to the percentages
of urban-to-urban migrants received. In term of the percentage of migrants in the total population,
only the city of Jacmel does not have a higher percentage than the other cities in the South East
Department. Because all the capitals meet at least one criteria of a regional pole 1) the largest
number of migrants to their departments compared to the MAPAP, 2) the largest substantial
number and percentage of cities that have a certain population size or, 3) the largest substantial
number and percentage of migrants from cities that are far away within their departments. The
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limitations of the research design should have less of an impact on the outcome of the study and the
tests of the hypotheses.

Identification of the Strongest Poles
The strongest poles at the national level: Influence of the MAPAP in the migration patterns
Question 1: How does the urban primacy of the MAPAP affect the attraction power of the
regional capitals?
Hypothesis 1: The MAPAP receives more migrants from the regions than the corresponding
regional capitals and the number of migrants to the regional capitals decreases when the distance
between the MAPAP and the regional capitals increase
Even at the regional level, the regional capitals face fierce competition from the MAPAP in
attracting intradepartmental migrants. There is an average 4.67 times more migrants from each
department in MAPAP than in the regional capitals. Except for Cap Haïtien with a ratio of 0.97,
more migrants from each region go to MAPAP than to their regional capitals: Cap Haïtien is the
strongest pole with the ability to compete against the MAPAP when it comes to attracting migrants
from the Department of the North. Port de Paix in the North West (1.12), Gonaives in the
Artibonite (2.05), and Fort Liberté in the North East (2.17) are strong poles. The highest ratios are
in the South East, with 49.60, followed by Grande Anse (38.82) and the Center (21.48). The capitals
of these departments (respectively Jacmel, Jérémie and Hinche are completely overshadowed by the
MAPAP and are the weakest poles (table 13 and figure 6).
Table 13: Migrants from the departments to MAPAP and to the regional capitals
Cap
Fort
Port de
Jacmel
Total
Haitien Liberte Gonaives Hinche Les Cayes Jeremie
Paix
MAPAP
67,652
31,746
3,224
39,069
18,989
85,878 107,067
12,794 366,419
Regional capitals
1,364
32,857
1,487
19,035
884
8,623
2,758
11,412
78,420
Ratio MAPAP/RC
49.60
0.97
2.17
2.05
21.48
9.96
38.82
1.12
4.67
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Figure 6: Migrants from the departments to the MAPAP and the regional capitals
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The gap between MAPAP and the regional capitals is also more important in terms of the total
number of migrants from other departments living in urban areas. MAPAP receives 88.42% of the
total number of migrants from other departments living in urban areas; the average for the regional
capitals is 0.72%; only Cap Haïtien and Gonaives have more than 1%, and all the other regional
capitals have less than 1% (table 12, 13).
The influence of the MAPAP over the entire Haitian urban system including the regional
capitals confirms theory of the overwhelming domination of a primate city over the entire country
(Jefferson 1939). However, Cap Haïtien, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté and Gonaives do have a strong
enough attraction power within their region to compete against the attraction power of the MAPAP
(Table 14).
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Table 14: Percentages of the total number of migrants living in the regional capitals and the MAPAP

Number of
Total number of % in the RC % of migrants migrants from
migrants
population from other cities other depts.
Place of residence
Jacmel
2,357
0.27
0.35
850
Cap Haïtien
44,470
5.16
6.66
10,718
Fort Liberté
2,098
0.24
0.31
386
Gonaives
24,702
2.87
3.70
5,565
Hinche
1,941
0.23
0.29
998
Les Cayes
10,590
1.23
1.59
1,728
Jérémie
3,359
0.39
0.50
568
Port de Paix
14,686
1.70
2.20
2,998
MAPAP
500,002
57.99 74.85
366,419
Total number of
migrants
862,166
Total number of
migrants to urban area
667,961
Total number from
other departments
467,016
Total number living in
urban areas from other
414,385
departments

% of
migrants
from other
depts. living
in urban
areas
%
0.10
0.21
1.24
2.59
0.04
0.09
0.65
1.34
0.12
0.24
0.20
0.42
0.07
0.14
0.35
0.72
42.50
88.42

The size of the cities of origin
Question 2: How does the population size of the cities of origin explain the number of
migrants?
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of migrants decreases when the size of the cities of origin
increases.
Depending on the department, the correlation between the number of migrants moving to
the regional capitals and the size of the cities of origin either weakly supports or rejects the
hypothesis. Only the North West, Grande Anse, and Artibonite departments support the hypothesis
with a weak negative correlation of -0.33, -0.39, and –0.18. The data for the remaining five
departments reject the hypothesis with a weak to moderate positive correlation: the number of
migrants tends to increase with the size of the city of origin. The Center, South East and South
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departments have a very weak positive correlation of 0.2, 0.12, and 0.065, respectively. The rejection
of the hypothesis is somewhat moderate for the North East and the North, which have a positive
correlation of 0.53 and 0.45 (table 15, maps 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
Depending on the department, migrants will come from smaller urban centers (North West,
Grande Anse, and Artibonite), slightly more from larger urban centers (Center, South East, and
South) and mainly from larger urban centers (North East and North).
Fort Liberté in the North East and Cap Haïtien in the North are the strongest poles that
have the capacity to attract migrants even from the other large cities of their departments. Port de
Paix in the North West, Jérémie in the Grande Anse and Gonaives in the Artibonite are the weakest.

Table 15: Correlation between distance, population, and number of migrants

Department

Correlation between size of the
cities of origin and the number of
migrants

Correlation between distance and
number of emigrants

North

0.53

-0.48

North West

-0.33

-0.53

North East

0.45

-0.59

South East

0.12

-0.46

Grande Anse

-0.39

-0.76

Artibonite

-0.18

-0.6

Center

0.2

-0.74

South
0.065
Correlation between population of the regional capitals and number of
migrants
Correlation between distance and number of migrants

-0.11
0.891960468
0.418266465

Size of the Cities of Origin
Question 3: How does the distance between the cities of origin and the destination (regional
capital) affect the number of migrants?
Hypothesis 3: The number of migrants decreases as the distance increases.
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The correlation between the number of migrants and the distance between the cities of
origin and destination supports the hypothesis, at different levels. All the departments present a
negative correlation. The attraction power of the regional capitals tends to decrease with distance.
The migrants principally originate from the closest cities. This result support Boudeville’s
assumption that the influence of a growth pole decreases with distance (Boudeville 1966).
The coefficient of correlation varies from a weak -0.11 for the South to a strong -0.76 for
the South East. (table 15, maps 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
Among the regional capitals, Les Cayes in the South has the largest geographic attraction
power while Jacmel in the South East has the weakest.
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Map 3: Artibonite
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Map 4: Center
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Map 5: Grande Anse
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Map 6: North
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Map 7: North East
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Map 8: North West
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Map 9: South
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Map 10: South East
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The composite index built with the ranking of the regional capitals by the scores for each
of the previous questions gives an overall ranking of the regional capitals illustrating their
attraction power. Cap Haïtien in the North is by far the strongest regional pole both at the
national and regional levels with a score of 22. It is followed by Les Cayes in the South (16) and
Fort Liberté (16) in the North East. Socio-economic activities should be relocated, public
investments should be concentrated, and private investments promoted in these cities to have the
most important impact (Rondinelli Jan-83; Rondinelli Oct-83). Even investing in the weakest pole
like Jérémie in the Grande Anse (with a score 4) will induce the development of the smaller
towns and the rural area of its department (Rondinelli 1978; Rondinelli Oct-83) (table 16).
These findings are a strong argument for aggressive government interventions in order to
make the regional capitals more attractive to migrants. This should initiate a more effective
decentralization process.

Table 16: Rank and composite index of attraction power

Regional
capitals
Cap Haitien
Port de Paix
Fort Liberte
Jacmel
Jeremie
Gonaives
Hinche
Les Cayes

8

Rank
Correlation
between distance and
number of emigrants
6

Rank ratio of
migrants from
the departments
to MAPAP and
to the regional
capitals
8

2

5

7

14

4

7

4

5

16

2-3

5

7

1

13

5

1

1

2

4

8

3

3

6

12

6

6

2

3

11

7

4

8

4

16

2-3

Rank
Correlation
between size of the
cities of origin and the
number of migrants

Composite index

Rank based on the
Index

22

1
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Explanation of the Poles’ Attraction Power
The Distance from the MAPAP
Question 4: How does the distance of the regional capital from the MAPAP explain the
number of migrants in the regional capitals?
Hypothesis 4: The number of migrants to the regional capitals increases when the
distance between the MAPAP and the regional capital increases
The regional urban systems also exist in the larger national system. According to the
growth pole theory and the assumptions of urban primacy, a primate city like Port-au-Prince will
have an important impact on the entire national urban system (Jefferson 1939). The impact of
Port-au-Prince on the capacity of a regional capital to attract urban-to-urban migrants from its
department will decrease with distance (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). In short, the regional
capital furthest to Port-Au-Prince will attract more migrants.
With a correlation of 0.41 between the distance from MAPAP and the number of
migrants, the primate city has a moderate effect on the number of migrants: the distance between
the regional capitals and the MAPAP has a moderate effect on the number of migrants received
and the regional capitals located further from MAPAP tend to receive a slightly more significant
number of migrants. However, some exceptions explain the moderate correlation. For instance,
Cap Haïtien and Fort Liberté are at relatively similar distance from Port-au-Prince (203.35 and
190.74 miles, respectively) but attract different percentages of migrants from the other cities of
their department (91.2% and 20.67%, respectively) (table 17). Although the size of MAPAP has
an important impact on the attraction power of the regional capitals, the moderate level of such
influence provides a hint that other factors also contribute greatly in explaining the attraction
power and the need for future research. Distance from the MAPAP should not be an important
concern when choosing the regional pole to re-enforce. The evidence does not support the
Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies 100 -

assumption of the urban primacy concept that the MAPAP, a primate city, will have an
overwhelming impact over all the cities of the Haitian urban system. At the same time, the
evidence moderately supports the assumption of the growth pole theory hypothesis that the
influence of the MAPAP will decrease when the distance increases.
Table 17: Size of the regional capitals, number of migrants, and distance from the MAPAP

Number of
Regional capitals Population migrants

Distance from
Port-au-Prince (miles)

Cap Haïtien

204,058

16,050

203.35

Fort Liberté

16,625

827

190.74

Gonaives

160,501

4,773

243.95

Hinche

24,131

520

151.98

Jacmel

30,183

710

115.96

Jérémie

33,829

1,384

80.43

Les Cayes

55,276

2,842

286.52

Port de Paix

70,742

4,998

228.50

Size of the Regional Capitals
Question 5: How does the size of the regional capitals explain the number of migrants?
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of migrants to the regional capitals increases with the size
of the population of the regional capitals
The data support the hypothesis with a strong correlation of 0.89 between the total
population of the regional capitals and the number of migrants received. There is also a strong
correlation of 0.78 between the percentage of the total urban population of the department
represented by the regional capitals and the percentage of migrants received. The largest regional
capitals and the regional capitals with the largest share of the urban population of their
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department attract more migrants. They are therefore the strongest poles (table 16, maps 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
The larger the regional capitals, the more migrants they attract from their own region
(Boudeville 1966; Boventer 1970). Thus, regional capitals of Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, and Port de
Paix will be able to play a more important role in decreasing the growth of the primate city of
Port-au-Prince.
The Local Private Sector
Question 6: How does dependency affect the migration patterns in urban centers?
Hypothesis 6: The amount of import taxes collected is higher in the strongest regional
capitals.
Tax collection points are located in all the regional capitals (except Hinche) as well as in
key urban centers that play a role in international trade (table 18).
Table 18: Import taxes by tax collection points (2001–2002)
Cities
Gonaives
Cap Haïtien
Miragoane
Port de Paix
Saint Marc
Ouanaminthe
Jacmel
Cayes
Petit Goave
Jérémie
Belladère
Fort Liberté
Anse à Pitres

Total import taxes
(in gourds)
75,639,219.34
157,897,655.24
108,607,104.60
26,987,838.37
90,153,466.86
11,736,285.58
970,227.32
4,813,272.58
4,500.00
698,645.53
1,300,239.36
2,099,326.24
34,919.53

Number of migrants
4773
16050
296
4998
1896
1513
710
2842
N/A
1384
225
827
839

The location of the collection points coinciding with the cities attracting the larger
percentage of migrants is the recognition, by the Haitian government, that the volume of
international trade occurring in those places will generate an amount of taxes significant enough
to justify such investments.
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The data support the hypothesis that the more attractive cities have stronger ties with the
international market. There is a strong positive correlation between the amount of taxes and the
number of migrants (0.70).
The amount of taxes collected depends on the volume of trade and the performance of
the local tax collection office. However, it is a very common practice to bribe customs officers to
avoid paying taxes. Local tax collection offices are often ill-equipped and understaffed, unable to
fully recover the taxes. Those two parameters vary from one collection point to another. The
historically high level of corruption in the Haitian public administration and the weakness of the
local institutions make it very unlikely that the amount of taxes reflects the actual trade volume at
each point. The tax data are used here with caution and the results must be interpreted with care.
In Cap Haïtien and Saint Marc there has been an increase in import-export activities, a
respective growth rate of 19.71% and 732%. Miragoane experienced a small decline of 10.04%
while Jacmel experienced an important decline of 85.56% (table 19).
Table 19: Growth rate of importation taxes by collection point (2000–2001 and 2001–2002)
Importation taxes
Cities

2000–2001

2001–2002

Growth rate

Gonaives

165,826,300.37

75,639,219.34

(54.39)

Cap Haïtien

131,902,009.42

157,897,655.24

19.71

Miragoane

120,724,376.73

108,607,104.60

(10.04)

Port de Paix

24,597,034.26

26,987,838.37

9.72

Saint Marc

10,829,544.13

90,153,466.86

732.48

Ouanaminthe

9,980,072.38

11,736,285.58

17.60

Jacmel

6,718,306.78

970,227.32

(85.56)

Cayes

5,964,046.87

4,813,272.58

(19.30)

Petit Goave

3,578,613.80

4,500.00

(99.87)

Jérémie

2,276,266.47

698,645.53

(69.31)

Belladère

500,576.19

1,300,239.36

159.75

Fort Liberté

185,708.87

2,099,326.24

1,030.44

Anse à Pîtres
Source: Research and Statistics, AGD

135,148.96

34,919.53

(74.16)
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Cap Haïtien is the farthest from Port-au-Prince (203.5 miles), while Saint Marc (52.20
miles) and Miragoane (58.20 miles) are both relatively close to the national capital. The distance
from Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of Cap Haïtien. The city is the main port for the entire
northern part of the country and the second largest city of the nation.
The proximity of Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of cities like Saint Marc and but to a
lesser extend in favor of Miragoane. The import taxes at the ports of these cities are less
expensive than Port-au-Prince and less congested. In addition, because of the short distance, it is
easy to use these ports to export goods that otherwise would have been shipped through Port-auPrince. These ports also have easy roadways access to the market of Port-au-Prince.
A similar attempt to increase the use of the port of Jacmel has been unsuccessful. The
port of Jacmel has been rehabilitated, but there has been little increase in import-export activities.
Jacmel is further away from Port-au-Prince (115.96 miles) than Saint Marc and Miragoane but is
still only two hours from Port-au-Prince. The population of Jacmel is not large enough to provide
a market for international trade.
However, Jacmel was in the past a very prosperous city, independent of Port-au-Prince
with striving import/export activities. Jacmel directly exported the coffee produced in the
surrounding areas. It also imported goods to be sold on its market and throughout the
department. The port of Jacmel was closed during the U.S. occupation (1915 – 1934). In addition,
a new road between Jacmel and Port-au-Prince was built to transport to the capital the coffee to
be sold on the international market (Gilles 1995).
The businessmen involved with coffee exports in Jacmel soon left the city to settle in
Port-au-Prince, owning until today the largest coffee export companies in the country. The
rehabilitation of the port of Jacmel occurred after national businessmen have already invested in
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cargo ships and warehouses in Saint Marc and Miragoane. The shares of the import/export trade
activities that could have gone to Jacmel were already taken over by these two cities.
Public investments in infrastructure alone did not stimulate the economy of the cities.
There was the lack of a dynamic private sector capable of taking advantage of such investments.
In addition, because of the small size of the country, the port cities are competing against each
other and all of them will not have enough share of the total trade activities to make such
investments sustainable.
The data support the dependency theory hypothesis. The link with the international
market explains the growth of growth poles outside of the primate city. A combination of
strategic location (on the coast), public investments (port facilities) and the local private sector
explain the growth of the strongest poles (Rondinelli 1983; Portes 1989; Portes 1994; Rondinelli
Jan-83). However, economic dependency also has important negative effects on the development
of developing countries and such dependency of the regional capitals’ economy might not lead
the economic growth and development of the country (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier
1981; Bradshaw 1997).
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Conclusion
The main objectives of the study are:


To identify, among the regional capitals, the cities that have the characteristics to be
potential “growth poles”



To explain how these cities differ from the other regional capitals



To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in
order to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce
the negatives consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will
improve the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document
(NSGPRD).

In the concluding chapter I present an evaluation of my findings in light of the literature
presented and the contribution of the research to the body of knowledge on Haiti,
decentralization, dependency, urban primacy, and development theories. I will also discuss the
policy relevance and implications of the research, made even more relevant by the devastating
earthquake of January 12, 2010.

A New Light on Urban Primacy and Decentralization
Prospects in Haiti and the Third world
Haiti is an example of extreme urban primacy, where if the Metropolitan Area of Port au
Prince (MAPAP) ratio was set at 100 people (population of 2.5 millions inhabitants), the second
city ratio in Cap Haïtien would be 8.1 (population of 204,508 inhabitants), and the third city ratio
in Gonaives would be 6.42 (population of 160,501 inhabitants). Twenty-five percent of Haiti’s
total population and 60% of the total urban population live in MAPAP. The migration data show
that the influence of MAPAP is overwhelming: 63.80% of the total number of migrants live in
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the Department of the West and 57.99% live in MAPAP; 84.10% of the number of migrants
from other departments live in the West and 78.46% live in MAPAP. The other departments
attract between 2.07% (North East) and 8.31% (Centre) of the total number of migrants (Table
2). The data confirm the literature about the consequences of urban primacy, such as the
overwhelming domination of most aspects of the national life by the primate city (Jefferson
1939).
The population of the primate city of MAPAP is more likely to increase due to the
current migration patterns. If nothing is done to halt this trend, the consequences of urban
primacy in the primate city will also worsen. Such consequences include social and spatial
exclusions (Fay 2005; Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2006; World Bank. Europe and Central
Asia Region. Infrastructure Sector Unit. 2006)); high unemployment rates; lack of basic services
such as decent housing, health care, clean water, and sanitation in slum-like neighborhoods in the
primate city; (Fay 2005) and violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006).
The overwhelming number and percentage of people migrating to MAPAP also
perpetrates a polarized system where the other cities, including the regional capitals, attract a
relatively low number and percentage of migrants. This slows the growth of the other cities and
limits their capacity to contribute to the cessation or reduction of the growth of the population of
MAPAP or to play an innovative diffusion and development role over their surrounding areas
(Pedersen 1970; Brown 1981).
The data show that the influence of MAPAP varies from one department to another and
that there are regional disparities in this influence. At the regional level, MAPAP attracts on
average 4.67 times more migrants from each department than the regional capital. Cap Haitien is
the only exception; it attracts 32,858 migrants while MAPAP attracts 31,746 from the
Department of the North. For the other regional capitals, the ratio of the number of migrants to
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MAPAP over the number of migrants to the regional capital varies from 1.12 for Port de Paix to
49.60 for Jacmel. These regional capitals can be divided into two groups based on the ratio. The
first group has a low ratio and includes Fort Liberte (2.17), Gonaives (2.05), Les Cayes (9.96), and
Port de Paix (1.12). The second group has a high ratio and includes the Jacmel (49.60) and
Jeremie (38.82) (Table 20).
Table 20: Migrants from the departments to MAPAP and to the regional capitals

MAPAP
Regional capitals
Ratio MAPAP/RC

South
East
67,652
1,364
49.60

North
31,746
32,857
0.97

North
East Artibonite Center
3,224
39,069
18,989
1,487
19,035
884
2.17
2.05
21.48

South
85,878
8,623
9.96

Grande
Anse
107,067
2,758
38.82

North
Total
West
12,794 366,419
11,412
78,420
1.12
4.67

Although these findings confirm the overwhelming influence of the primate city of
MAPAP over the migration patterns of the entire nation, they also show that there are
spatial/regional variations to this influence. These variations allow for the identification of cities
among the regional capitals that 1) attract more migrants than MAPAP (Cap Haitien); 2) attract a
number of migrants that is lower than MAPAP’s (Fort Liberte, Gonaives and Port de Paix); and
3) attract a number of migrants that is very small compared to MAPAP (Hinche, Les Cayes,
Jacmel, and Jeremie).
In addition, the data show that the regional capitals are all the primary destinations for
migrants in their respective departments. On average, the department capitals receive 54.61% of
the migrants while the other cities attract only an average of 3.79% of the urban-to-urban
migrants—an average that is 14.41 times less than the capitals. The numbers vary from 20.67%
for Fort Liberté to 91.12% for Cap Haïtien at the regional level.
These findings show that, even in the case of extreme urban primacy like Haiti, there can
be cities that have more influence over a given geographical area than the primate city (Cap
Haitien) while other cities have a somewhat comparable influence (Gonaives and Port de Paix).
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These findings bring new light in the literature about urban primacy that tends to be pessimistic
and generic: the primate city of MAPAP does not have an overwhelming and uniform influence
over the entire national territory. There are regional disparities and there are regions where the
influence of the primate city is lower than that of the largest city within the region. This adds to
the body of literature about urban primacy in general and urban primacy in Haiti in particular.
The findings of the present study bring new prospects to the future of decentralization
policies in countries with extreme cases of urban primacy like Haiti. Some scholars explain the
failures of decentralization by citing the lack of secondary cities, which are cities that are large
enough to perform important economic and social functions for their own populations and for
populations in surrounding areas (Rondinelli 1983). In other words, cities that will be able to
diffuse development at a regional level, attract and retain rural migrants, and slow the growth of
the primate city. Cap Haitien, by attracting more migrants than MAPAP in the department of the
North, fits this description. The cities of Fort Liberte, Gonaives, Les Cayes, and Port de Paix that
attract a slightly lower number of migrants from their respective region than MAPAP can be
reinforced to attract more migrants and fit the description of secondary city as well. These cities
can be instrumental in halting the growth of MAPAP.
In addition, the regional capitals are the main destination for migrants in their respective
regions. The regional capitals are already regional poles that can be reinforced to play a more
important role in inducing development in their region. The combination of secondary cities at
the national level and poles at the regional level is a positive sign in the prospect of a successful
decentralization process in Haiti.
The identification of regional poles is an important contribution to the debate
surrounding decentralization in Haiti. Opponents of decentralization have argued that the local
collectivities are not strong enough to carry out the new powers that come with decentralization
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(Deshommes 2000; Oriol April 2000). While that may be true for the majority of the local
collectivities, especially the municipalities, the ones where the regional capitals (and more
specifically where the three poles identified earlier) are located are clearly strong enough to
compete with MAPAP at the national level and can be reinforced by the policymakers to become
real engines of development at the regional level. They are strong enough to be used to
implement a successful decentralization process.
The findings also provide arguments for an incremental implementation of the
decentralization process to maximize the use of scarce public funds by focusing on the cities that
will have the greatest impact in halting the growth of MAPAP and inducing substantial regional
development. Indeed, not all the local collectivities are identical and the poles identified earlier
can play an important role in rebalancing the spatial distribution of socioeconomic activities. The
poles are the secondary cities as described by Rondinelli (1983) and should be reinforced to
maximize the chances of success of the current decentralization policy in Haiti.
Finally, the study adds a new element to the debate by analyzing the Haitian urban system
and how it can help reshape the spatial distribution of socioeconomic activities.
Urban primacy is widespread and is increasing in the developing world. The challenges
caused by urban primacy in the developing world are very hard but not impossible to overcome.
Even in the case of extreme urban primacy like Haiti, this study has been able to identify cities
with the potential to halt or reverse the consequences of urban primacy. In addition, Haiti is a
relatively small country and given the influence of distance in explaining the existence of potential
poles, the results are encouraging. Larger countries, even with extreme cases of urban primacy,
will probably have potential growth poles.
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Future of Testing the Growth Pole Theory in a Third
World country
The study tested some of the hypotheses of the growth theory, namely the impact of the
size of the cities and the distance between cities in explaining the number of migrants. The
distance between the regional capitals and MAPAP has a moderate effect on the number of
migrants received and the regional capitals located further from MAPAP tend to receive a slightly
more significant number of migrants. The moderate effect of distance is to be expected given the
overwhelming influence of the primate city of MAPAP over the national territory.
However, overall the number of migrants tends to decrease when the distance between
the regional capital and the city of origin increases. The data show different levels of support for
the growth pole theory hypothesis that the attraction power of a pole decreases when the distance
increases (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). The influence of the regional capitals over the regional
urban systems is less strong than the influence of MAPAP over the national urban system.
The data strongly support the assumption that the attraction power of the regional
capitals increases with population size. The data support the hypothesis with a strong correlation
of 0.89 between the total population of the regional capitals and the number of migrants received.
There is also a strong correlation of 0.78 between the percentage of the total urban population of
the department represented by the regional capitals and the percentage of migrants received
(Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). The regional capitals with the largest population are the
strongest poles. Increasing the size of a pole by providing job opportunities or education and
health facilities will in return strengthen its attraction power exponentially.
The data also provide evidence that, depending on the department, migrants come from
cities with largely different population sizes, weakly supporting or rejecting the growth theory
hypothesis that migrants will come from smaller cities (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). Only the
North West, Grande Anse, and Artibonite departments support the hypothesis with a weak
Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies 111 -

negative correlation; the Center, South East, and South departments have a very weak positive
correlation, and the North East and the North moderately reject the hypothesis. Depending on
the department, migrants will come from smaller urban centers (North West, Grande Anse, and
Artibonite), slightly more from larger urban centers (Center, South East, and South), and mainly
from larger urban centers (North East and North). This shows that the attraction power of the
regional poles is strong even over the largest urban centers of their regions. However, this can
also imply that even the more important urban centers, including possibly the regional capitals,
have difficulty retaining their populations. A question to investigate in the future is whether the
larger urban centers are temporary destinations before migrating to MAPAP. If the answer is yes,
another question to investigate is how to retain these transitory migrants. In addition to attracting
more migrants, the poles need to be able to retain them and retain their own population.
My findings do not definitively support or reject the hypotheses of the growth pole
theory that I have tested. The theory selects poles by the concentration of economic activities. In
the case of this study, the selection is solely based on the administrative characteristics of the
regional capitals while the regional capitals have different demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics. I have used this selection method because I wanted to use the results to formulate
policy recommendations that reflect the constitution of Haiti. Those differences may explain the
different levels of support or rejection to the hypotheses, depending on the department.

The growth pole theory was useful, however, in helping identify potential regional growth
poles in a developing country with an extreme case of urban primacy like Haiti with its mega city,
MAPAP. The findings confirm that despite the overwhelming influence of the primate city, it is
still possible to identify urban centers that are suitable places to begin implementing
decentralization. One of the main obstacles in testing the growth pole theory in a Third World
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country is the lack of or limited availability of data (Rondinelli 1983). To conduct this research, I
was fortunate enough to have data available and such data are becoming more widely available;
this study illustrates how to use census data to address the consequences of urban primacy in
developing countries. An increasing number of developing countries are conducting census
operations on a regular basis. The United Nations Population Funds (UNFPA) and its partners
have mobilized funds for a census round every 10 years in developing countries. UNFPA and its
partners are also working on standardizing the census’ instruments and modernization the
operations by using GPS, GIS, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), and database software in order
to improve the quality of the data.
The activities of UNFPA and its partners aim at better monitoring the progresses made in
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). However, the availability of new census
data eliminates the obstacles for testing the growth pole theory in the developing countries. In
addition, the actors are also promoting the use of census data to support development programs.
This will provide a lot of opportunities to test the growth pole theory hypothesis in the third
world, including cross-country or temporal analysis to assess the impact of a decentralization
policy.

Dependency Theory and Regional Urban Growth in Haiti
All the regional capitals except Hinche have local import tax collection agencies. The
establishment of the tax collection agencies in these cities is a recognition that substantial
international trade activities are occurring. Although there is a positive correlation between the
amount of taxes collected and the number and the percentage of migrants received, this result
should be used with caution because of the poor quality of the data.
Except for Hinche, all the regional capitals are coastal cities. They are in strategic
locations that put them at the forefront of the link of the Haitian economy to the international

Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies 113 -

market. This role is reinforced by the existence of port facilities and the presence of a vibrant
private sector involved in substantial trade activities.
The integration of their economic activities into the international economic system due to
their location, reinforced by port facilities and substantial export-oriented economic activities,
explains the growth and attraction power of the regional capitals and rival poles.
Finally, the data support the hypothesis of dependency theory stating that the cities with
the strongest attraction power have the strongest ties with the international market; these ties are
expressed by the amount of import taxes collected (Portes 1985; Portes 1994). These results and
findings support the dependency theory hypotheses and more specifically Portes’ that, outside the
primate city, cities with export-oriented economic activities grow at a faster pace (Portes 1994;
Portes 1997). Is the effect of dependency on the growth of other urban centers yet another
indicator of how economic dependency overall affects urban growth? Or, finally, is it an indicator
of stronger integration of not only the economy but also of all the parts of the Haitian territory in
the international economy? Haiti is a developing country and as such, the dependent nature of its
economy will have a negative impact on its socioeconomic development (Cardoso 1971;
Bradshaw 1987; Bradshaw 1991; Bradshaw 1997).

Recommendations for Future Research
The Limitations Due to the Lack of Data
I have primarily used data that are available for all the units of analysis. This approach was
necessary to be able to compare the results and draw conclusions that are essential to formulate
recommendations to implement economic decentralization. However, this approach also limited
the quantity of data available to fully understand the issues. In a developing country like Haiti,
there are few institutions that collect routinely data on socioeconomic activities to inform
policymakers. This situation makes it often difficult to conduct research in the Third World.
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The first set of data that I have used is the census data that give, per department, the
number of natives and the commune of place or birth (urban and rural). Unfortunately there are
no data on the number of people who migrate from one regional capital to another. This
information would have been useful to measure the ability of the capitals to retain their migrants
or natives or their ability to attract migrants from the other capitals; in other words, the
competitiveness within the national urban system. However, one can still know, for each city, the
number of total migrants from every other department (table 6).
The second set of data is the amount of import taxes to measure the dependency toward
the international economy. This choice was dictated by the lack of economic data at the regional
level. Data about the total value of goods imported–exported are only available at the national
level and not by trade locations. Data on the private sector/employment for all the regional
capitals are not available in a country where 68% of nonagricultural activities function in the
informal sector. However, for the fiscal year of 2008–2009 for instance, the Haitian GDP was
14,015 million gourdes while the value of imports was 18,317 and the value of exports was 4,312
million gourdes (BRH 2010). These data show that Haiti imports more than it produces and the
value of exports is really minimal compared to the value of imports. Data on importations
provide a good estimation of international trade activities in the regional capitals.
The study calls for future research that will help explain some of the findings and better
understand the Haitian urban system and the attraction power of the regional capitals. The future
research will also provide policymakers with additional elements to design a more detailed
economic decentralization policy. The list of recommendations for future research presented here
is in no mean exhaustive.
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Test the Growth Pole Theory Using Other Criteria to Select the
Units of Analysis
One of the characteristics of the research design is the selection of the units of analysis
based on their administrative status as regional capitals. The regional capitals vary largely in terms
of population size. They also vary in terms of the percentage of the total urban population they
represent.
These variations may have affected the outcomes of the analysis and the results and
findings. Conducting a similar analysis with, for instance, an urban center with the same
population size or the same percentage of the total population of their departments may give a
different outcome in testing the assumptions and hypotheses of the growth pole theory.
Study of the Attraction Power of the Regional Capitals Beyond
the Limits of the Regions
Because the study analyzes migration patterns within regions, I cannot evaluate the
attraction power of the regional capital beyond their region. I cannot evaluate the competition
among regional capitals to capture migrants beyond the borders of their respective departments.
Finally, I cannot assess if one regional capital has a broader attraction power even over another
regional capital. For instance, does Cap Haitien attract more migrants from the North East than
Fort Liberte, its regional capital? Or does Cap Haitien attract more migrants from the North East
than MAPAP?
The answers to those questions will be useful to policymakers to design an economic
decentralization policy between the national level and the regional level, regrouping several
departments. Such policy will reinforce existing spatial dynamics and better allocate limited public
resources.
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Understanding the Migrants’ Journey to Better Understanding of
the Attraction Power of the Regional Capitals
The 2003 Haitian census questionnaire asks the respondents about their birthplace and
whether it is urban or rural. The respondents whose birthplace differs from the place of residence
are the migrants. However, this information does not provide a complete picture of the migrants’
journey. For instance, have they migrated to another place before settling in the current place of
residence? For how long? Are they planning on staying or moving to another place? Why did they
move? Why do they want to move again?
The answers to these questions will provide a more complete picture about what attracts
migrants to the regional capitals or other places. Knowing where people move and why they
move is essential to designing a spatial policy to attract them to specific places and to retain
people in those places. These policies should focus on offering to the potential migrants the
elements that are missing in the current place of residence that they want to have access to by
migrating.
A Better Understanding of the Structure of the Regional
Capitals’ Private Sector
The analysis of the import tax data to understand how dependency toward the
international market affects population growth in the regional capitals shows a high level of
correlation.
The data also show that in Cap Haïtien and Saint Marc there has been an increase in
import-export activities, a respective growth rate of 19.71% and 732%. Miragoane experienced a
small decline of 10.04%, while Jacmel experienced an important decline of 85.56% (table 19).
Cap Haïtien is the farthest from Port-au-Prince (203.5 miles), while Saint Marc (52.20
miles) and Miragoane (58.20 miles) are both relatively close to the national capital. The distance
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from Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of Cap Haïtien. The city is the main port for the entire
northern part of the country and the second largest city of the nation.
The port of Jacmel has been rehabilitated, but there has been little increase in importexport activities. Jacmel is further away from Port-au-Prince (115.96 miles) than Saint Marc and
Miragoane but is still only two hours from Port-au-Prince. The population of Jacmel is not large
enough to provide a market for international trade.
An analysis of the history of the city of Jacmel shows, for instance, that a change in the
local private sector can help explain why the city is no longer able to engage in trade activities, as
was the case in the past, despite heavy public investments in port facilities. A study of the local
private sector involved in trade will help explain this issue, and help to design a policy to support
the emergence of a more dynamic local private sector that will be able to increase the return on
public investments.
Spatial Modeling to Understand and Predict Migration Patterns
The results and findings of the present study and of future research can be used with
other spatial data to model migration patterns in Haiti. They should be combined with other
spatial data such as satellite images, aerial photos, road maps, and topographic maps. GIS, remote
sensing, and other technologies in the fields of spatial analysis can incorporate the various data to
build a complex spatial model. Policymakers can use this model to better understand migration
patterns but also predict the effect of specific policies on these patterns. Finally, such a model can
be used as a monitoring and evaluation tool to assess the outcome of a national spatial economic
decentralization policy.
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Policy Relevance and Implications
After the devastating 7.0 earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, the international
community responded swiftly during the rescue and the immediate post-disaster relief efforts.
The international community also made the commitment of continuing support for the
rebuilding of Haiti. The Haitian government has expressed a strong determination to place the
rebuilding effort in the context of the overall development of the country. The Haitian
government and its partners held a first meeting in Montreal on January 25, 2010, and another
meeting was held in New York on March the 31, 2010, during which the government presented
the Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the National Strategic
Development Plan (NSDP) for the country to the donors.
To elaborate the PDNA and the NSDP, the government has been conducting intensive
consultations with members of the international community and groups of the Haitian civil
society. According to the government, the result of the process is a document that should
continue the program that the government had in place with the NGPRSD but will also address
the issues brought to light by the earthquake. Because the PDNA and the NSDP have not been
released yet, the policy recommendations will focus on the NGPRSD but will also address the
elements of the new national reconstruction program that have been released to the press so far.
Elaborate a Comprehensive Economic Decentralization Policy
Based on the Reinforcement of the Strongest Growth Poles
The NGPRSD proposes activities as if Haiti will remain a rural country. The issues raised
by this research are not addressed in a coherent and comprehensive manner in the NSGPRD.
Elements of the solutions are scattered all over the documents and some elements are completely
missing.

Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies 119 -

The NGPRSD presents a series of activities pertaining to urban development at the city
level. All these activities are essential to addressing important issues facing the Haitian cities. They
will all contribute to creating vibrant and safe urban centers, improving the urban environment
and providing employment opportunities and basic services to urban dwellers.
However, instead of scattering them throughout the document, it would have brought
focus and attention to regroup them in a single comprehensive chapter, as is the case for rural
development. Such a chapter would include the existing elements as well as a section of urban
economic activities. Urban economic activities like industrial activities are missing from the
NGPRSD. This chapter should also include strategic and spatial components. The NGPRSD

should include a chapter on how the government plans to increase public investments in activities
that will make specific cities as attractive as MAPAP (e.g., water, electricity, communications, and
transportation infrastructure). At the same time, the government should lay out this plan to
promote private investments in essential services such as banking. Finally, the government should
provide incentives for existing private industries to relocate outside of MAPAP and to new
investors to establish their companies outside MAPAP. These efforts should focus on the
strongest regional poles identified in the present study.
Decentralization of Economic Activities: Focus on the Strongest
Poles
Real decentralization will be achieved by delocalizing socioeconomic activities outside
MAPAP. The primary beneficiaries of the delocalization of economic activities and social services
outside Port-au-Prince should be the strongest poles: Cap Haitien, Port de Paix, and Gonaives.
These cities should be in the mind of public officials when they are working with investors for
non-geographic based economic activities. Some activities that can be delocalized are, for
instance, the manufacturing jobs in textiles. In each of the three strongest poles, there is the
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necessary labor force, the basic infrastructure in electricity, water, and communications to support
these activities, and the international port facilities to ship the manufactured goods to the national
and international markets.
Cap Haitien has direct flights to and from Miami and Port au Prince. Gonaives is only
37.28 miles from MAPAP. However, Port-de-Paix is more isolated, with a single roadway
connection to Cap Haitien that also connects the city to the rest of the country.
Goods from production sites in Cap-Haitien and Gonaives can more easily reach the
national market. Investors in these sites could more easily reach their investment sites for quality
control or other operation activities. For Port-de-Paix to present the same advantages, significant
public investments in roadways should be made. Cap Haïtien is the second largest city in the
country and is at all levels the most attractive pole outside MAPAP. It can play an important role
in attracting migrants not only from the department of the North but from all the northern parts
of the country as well.
The road network should be improved and rehabilitated in this perspective. Targeting the
most attractive cities in a more aggressive manner can be the best way to still have the most
impact while using limited resources. Similar important public investments in an important
number of cities competing for the same markets/resources can limit the returns of such
investments.
Some of the elements of this part of the policy recommendations are already in the
NGPRSD. However, they are not regrouped in the identified poles and are not part of an overall
strategy to implement decentralization. There must be a better coordination of effort towards
reinforcing the strongest poles in order to maximize their impact.
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Encourage Spatially Based Economic Activities
Besides these three cities, the other regional capitals already have most of the basic
necessary infrastructure (electricity, phone, internet, water), although some improvements are
needed. They have port facilities that link them to international markets in the case of exportoriented production. They also have a population large enough and often more educated than
those of smaller cities to offer the manpower to support the initial activities. The creation of jobs
and the availability of social services will increase the attraction power of the regional capitals.
At the same time, it is necessary to maintain activities that are locally based in other places
and cities as well. Such activities would include the development of local tourism and the
rehabilitation of the old town of Jacmel, for example. In the NGPRSD, tourism focuses on the
departments of the West, the North, the South East, and the South because of their potential in
this sector. These activities are expected to create an significant number of employment
opportunities outside MAPAP. This will contribute to the reduction of the concentration of job
opportunities in the primate city, halting its growth while contribution the population growth of
the regions.
In addition, public investments in infrastructure and roadways should seek to strengthen
the relationship between regional capitals and the other cities of their region in order to transform
the hinterland into a market for the sale of the goods produced or imported in the regional
capitals. At the same time, the regional capitals will become a market for the production of
smaller cities and the rural areas in their region.
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Toward a Less Dependent Economy: Promote National Production
for the National Market
The study shows the role of economic dependency in explaining the growth of the
regional capitals. However, economic dependency also has a very negative impact on the
socioeconomic development of developing countries (Cardoso 1971; Myrdal 1978; Bradshaw
1991). The increase of the national production is a major component of the NGPRSD. However,
the new economic policy should also strive to find the balance between production for the
national market and production for the international market. This will reduce the dependency of
the Haitian economy and the negative impact of such dependency on the socioeconomic
development of the country.
Effective Leadership
The rural area has a single institution in charge: the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural
Resources and Rural Development (MANRRD). The mission of the MANRRD is to “Define the
policy of the economic sector of the Haitian government in the areas of agriculture, cattle raising,
renewable natural resources and rural development.” The urban area has no institution in charge
of coordinating efforts and resources. Several governmental entities share responsibilities over the
urban area: the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation,
and the Ministry of Local Collectivities. At the local level, the municipalities are in charge.
Because of the multiplicity of actors there is no clear vision, instead there is a lack of leadership
or coordination and an overlapping of roles, goals, and responsibilities.
This lack of one focal point explains why this document contains all the dimensions of
urban development and no vision. Such an organ will:
•

Set a vision

•

Coordinate actions
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•

Bring all the actors together

•

Do advocacy and fundraising

This organ would bring urban development issues to the forefront of the national debates.
An effective decentralization policy requires not only strong leadership from the Haitian
government, but also the inclusion of the private sector, the donors, the local institutions, and
many other stakeholders in the process. It also requires the same leadership ability from the local
institutions. All the policy recommendations have no real value until real changes occur within
the Haïtian government, which is still considered among the weakest and the most corrupted in
the world by Transparency International. In addition, the quasi-permanent state of political
instability of the country often discourages potential investors. The chances for a successful
implementation of an effective decentralization policy rely on substantial changes in all aspects of
the social, political, and economic life of the country. Fortunately, the relative stability of the past
five years and the progress made in terms of governance offer good hope that the overall
environment might be improving.

The Impact of the Earthquake
Local and foreign investors are still reluctant to invest in Haiti because of the constant
political turmoil of past 2–3 decades. However, a large majority of violent events usually occur in
MAPAP; the rest of the country remains safe. Thus, the strongest poles and the regional capitals
are a safe and secure alternative to MAPAP. In addition, there has been an overall improvement
in security in Haiti. As former U.S. President Bill Clinton, currently the special envoy of the
United Nations to Haiti, recently stated, “It is time to invest in Haiti” (Lacey 2009). This new
hope should be channeled to address the problems caused by the primacy of MAPAP.
Unfortunately, all the new hope changed with the January 12, 2010, earthquake.
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In addition, the earthquake shone a brighter light on most of the issues raised by the
present research and makes its policy relevance even more important. Today, the Haitian
government is working with its national and international partners to prepare the Post Disaster
Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework (PDNA) and the NSDP. In his speech on February
18, 2010, the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Planning, acknowledges most of the
issues raised by this study and put under a magnifying glass by the earthquake. Followed are two
excerpts from the speech that clearly demonstrates that decentralization, deconcentration of
socioeconomic activities, and territorial balance are important concerns of the Haitian
government.
“We share a dream: the one to see Haiti as an emerging country by 2030, a simple and
equal society, just and united, living in harmony with its environment, its culture and a controlled
modernity where freedom of association and expression et land management are established, with
of a modern, strong, dynamic, competitive, open economy, and with large territorial basis where
the basic needs to the population are met and manage by a strong government, united and
protective of the general interests, strongly deconcentrated and decentralized."
“Our efforts focus on finding the balance between population and territory. Demography
is an important issue and the deployment of the population on the territory is an issue as well.
That is why we need to talk about regional development poles, about access to health and
education services all over the national territory, about deconcentrated government services, of
roads networks allowing for the circulation of people and goods. The country and its regions
should position themselves in a network open to international partners and to economic ties with
the outside."
In addition, according to an article published on the Voice of America website relating a
joint news conference held by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Haitian President
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Rene Preval at the State Department in Washington, DC on March 9, 2010, the Haitian president
acknowledges the role that past government policies focusing on MAPAP to the detriment of the
regions have played in favoring migration toward MAPAP, the lack of urban planning, poverty,
and inadequate housing that contributed to the mass casualties of the earthquake. According to
the Prime Minister, "To rebuild Port-au-Prince as it was before would be a major historical
mistake. And that is the message that I am trying to convey, not only to the Haitians, but also to
my international partners."
Now the questions are:
-

How will decentralization be implemented?

-

Will the government once again focus on national agricultural
production and neglect the urban economy? What kind of economic
relationships will the government try to implement with the
international market?

The answers to these questions will determine the chances of success of the
decentralization process and the impact that the economic policies will have on the
socioeconomic development of Haiti.
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Appendix 1: Population data by department

Department of Artibonite
COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Urban population

Gonaïves

263,716

103,215

160,501

Ennery

39,104

35,972

3,132

Estère

33,860

20,814

13,046

Gros Morne

118,163

96,956

21,207

Terre Neuve

23,920

23,014

906

Anse Rouge

32,271

23,404

8,867

Saint Marc

199,637

109,255

90,382

Verrettes

109,474

82,547

26,927

La Chapelle

23,986

20,321

3,665

Dessalines

138,451

120,227

18,224

Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite

129,360

102,348

27,012

Grande Saline

17,143

14,319

2,824

Desdunes

27,266

8,296

18,970

Saint Michel de l'Attalaye

114,175

92,717

21,458

Marmelade

28,872

23,517

5,355

Total

1,299,398

876,922

422,476

Department of the Centre

COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Urban population

Hinche

93,899

69,768

24,131

Maïssade

45,869

36,466

9,403

Thomonde

35,307

28,289

7,018

Cerca Carvajal

18,102

14,584

3,518

Mirebalais

76,194

64,363

11,831

Saut d'Eau

30,499

27,209

3,290

Boucan Carré

43,813

41,437

2,376

Lascahobas

48,665

42,168

6,497

Belladère

67,526

57,606

9,920

Savanette

28,260

25,235

3,025

Cerca la Source

44,129

39,299

4,830

Thomassique

49,242

40,462

8,780

Total

581,505

486,886

94,619

Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies 136 -

Department of Grande Anse
COMMUNE

Rural Population

Urban population

Total population

Jérémie

70,060

33,829

103,889

Abricots

28,418

978

29,396

Bonbon

5,440

1,248

6,688

Moron

21,602

2,653

24,255

Chambellan

17,184

3,380

20,564

Anse d'Hainault

17,983

10,142

28,125

Dame Marie

21,653

8,357

30,010

Les Irois

11,963

6,109

18,072

Corail

21,215

3,245

24,460

Roseaux

26,351

1,530

27,881

Beaumont

10,908

4,349

15,257

Pestel

33,992

788

34,780

Miragoane

61,982

16,126

78,108

Petite Rivière de Nippes

19,935

2,276

22,211

Anse-à-Veau

50,199

2,233

52,432

Baradères

33,236

3,322

36,558

Petit Trou de Nippes

38,816

3,016

41,832

L'Asile

31,216

1,194

32,410

Total

522,153

104,775

626,928

Department of North
COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Urban population

Cap-Haïtien

211,630

7,572

204,058

Quartier Morin

21,100

18,958

2,142

Limonade

42,530

32,731

9,799

Acul du Nord

43,118

37,097

6,021

Plaine du Nord

31,817

25,162

6,655

Milot

24,673

19,851

4,822

Grde Rivière du Nord

31,900

23,959

7,941

Bahon

17,932

16,655

1,277

St Raphaël

41,458

33,571

7,887

Dondon

26,688

21,448

5,240

Ranquitte

21,366

19,139

2,227

Pignon

33,366

26,176

7,190

La Victoire

8,129

5,650

2,479

Borgne

51,612

46,356

5,256

Port Margot

38,468

28,860

9,608

Limbé

65,788

39,612

26,176

Bas Limbé

16,118

12,113

4,005

Plaisance

53,665

44,679

8,986

Pilate

41,685

38,136

3,549

Total

823,043

497,725

325,318
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Department of North East

COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Urban population

Fort-Liberté

26,679

10,054

16,625

Ferrier

11,410

5,871

5,539

Perches

9,016

4,861

4,155

Ouanaminthe

82,549

38,775

43,774

Capotille

15,390

14,586

804

Mont Organisé

16,562

13,608

2,954

Trou du Nord

38,225

21,839

16,386

Sainte Suzanne

22,242

20,743

1,499

Terrier Rouge

23,474

8,376

15,098

Caracol

6,051

4,030

2,021

Vallières

18,620

16,091

2,529

Carice

10,709

7,800

2,909

Mombin Crochu

27,458

23,879

3,579

Total

308,385

190,513

117,872

Department of Nord West

COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Urban population

Port-de-Paix

157,032

86,290

70,742

La Tortue

28,499

27,104

1,395

Bassin Bleu

46,458

42,371

4,087

Chansolme

12,594

10,953

1,641

Saint Louis du Nord

84,661

61,581

23,080

Anse à Foleur

22,052

17,935

4,117

Môle Saint Nicolas

24,787

22,366

2,421

Baie de Henne

19,985

18,434

1,551

Bombardopolis

26,392

24,368

2,024

Jean Rabel

108,738

100,998

7,740

Total

531,198

412,400

118,798

Department of the South
COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Les Cayes

132,406

77,130

55,276

Torbeck

61,080

57,786

3,294

Chantal

27,350

24,631

2,719

Camp-Perrin

36,124

33,032

3,092

Maniche

6,973

6,291

682

Urban population

Ile-à-Vache

12,341

12,341

0

Port-Salut

29,987

28,527

1,460

Saint Jean du Sud

20,539

19,821

718

Arniquet

8,751

7,554

1,197

Aquin

83,525

74,832

8,693

Saint Louis du Sud

51,862

49,705

2,157

Cavaillon

41,476

40,000

1,476

Côteaux

16,987

12,660

4,327

Port-à-Piment

15,040

9,743

5,297

Roche-à-Bateau

14,719

12,520

2,199

Chardonnières

20,126

14,932

5,194

Les Anglais

23,840

17,886

5,954

Tiburon

18,525

12,637

5,888

Total

621,651

512,028

109,623

Urban population

Department of South East
COMMUNE

Total Population

Rural population

Jacmel

142,969

112,786

30,183

Marigot

57,311

52,256

5,055

Cayes-Jacmel

30,968

28,521

2,447

La Vallée

28,014

27,232

782

Bainet

66,694

64,204

2,490

Côtes de Fer

37,694

36,181

1,513

Belle Anse

58,352

55,291

3,061

Grand Gosier

13,067

11,394

1,673

Thiotte

26,722

22,490

4,232

Anse à Pitres

22,884

14,678

8,206

Total

484675

425033

59642

Appendix 2: Urban population maps for the eight departments

Department of Artibonite
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Appendix 3: Migration data by department
Artibonite
Cities

Population

Anse Rouge

Number of migrants

8,867

749

Desdunes

18,970

516

Dessalines

18,224

321

Ennery

3,132

248

Estère

13,046

286

Grande Saline

2,824

118

Gros Morne

21,207

942

La Chapelle

3,665

0

Marmelade

5,355

142

Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite

27,012

59

Saint Marc

90,382

167

Saint Michel de l'Attalaye

21,458

277

906

898

26,927

50

Terre Neuve
Verrettes
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

Grande Anse
Cities

Population

Abricots

Number of migrants

29,396

276

Anse d'Hainault

28,125

31

Anse-à-Veau

52,432

2

Baradères

36,558

5

Beaumont

15,257

144

6,688

108

Chambellan

20,564

178

Corail

24,460

101

Dame Marie

30,010

57

L'Asile

32,410

0

Les Irois

18,072

12

Miragoane

78,108

1

Moron

24,255

153

Pestel

34,780

68

Petit Trou de Nippes

41,832

0

Petite Rivière de Nippes

22,211

0

Roseaux

27,881

248

Bonbon

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

148

Centre
Cities

Population

Number of migrants

Belladère

9,920

10

Boucan Carré

2,376

3

Cerca Carvajal

3,518

110

Cerca la Source

4,830

56

Lascahobas

6,497

10

Maïssade

9,403

160

Mirebalais

11,831

20

Saut d'Eau

3,290

8

Savanette

3,025

20

Thomassique

8,780

88

Thomonde

7,018

35

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

North
Cities

Population

Number of migrants

Acul du Nord

6021

Bahon

1277

0

Bas Limbé

4005

295

Borgne

5256

1375

Dondon

5240

1316

Grde Rivière du Nord

7941

1170

La Victoire

1109

2479

62

26176

1512

Limonade

9799

1311

Milot

4822

1167

Pignon

7190

308

Pilate

3549

756

Plaine du Nord

6655

1650

Plaisance

8986

608

Port Margot

9608

1880

Quartier Morin

2142

496

Ranquitte

2227

227

St Raphaël

7887

808

Limbé

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

149

North East
Cities

Population

Capotille

Number of migrants
804

33

Caracol

2,021

5

Carice

2,909

5

Ferrier

5,539

104

Mombin Crochu

3,579

2

Mont Organisé

2,954

2

Ouanaminthe

43,774

125

4,155

17

Perches
Sainte Suzanne

1,499

17

Terrier Rouge

15,098

325

Trou du Nord

16,386

77

2,529

117

Vallières
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

North West
Cities

Population

Number of migrants

Anse à Foleur

1,395

Baie de Henne

4,087

9

Bassin Bleu

1,641

371

23,080

67

Bombardopolis

823

Chansolme

4,117

358

Jean Rabel

2,421

1576

La Tortue

1,551

717

Môle Saint Nicolas

2,024

145

Saint Louis du Nord

7,740

932

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

150

South
Cities

Population

Number of migrants

Aquin

8,693

52

Arniquet

1,197

122

Camp-Perrin

3,092

137

Cavaillon

1,476

73

Chantal

2,719

235

Chardonnières

5,194

310

Côteaux

4,327

188

Les Anglais

5,954

172

Maniche

682

53

Port-à-Piment

5,297

106

Port-Salut

1,460

118

Roche-à-BΓteau

2,199

98

Saint Jean du Sud

718

215

Saint Louis du Sud

2,157

99

Tiburon

5,888

217

Torbeck

3,294

647

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

South East
Cities

Population

Number of migrants

Anse à Pitres

8,206

46

Bainet

2,490

127

Belle Anse

3,061

179

Cayes-Jacmel

2,447

129

Côtes de Fer

1,513

20

Grand Gosier

1,673

8

782

30

Marigot

5,055

148

Thiotte

4,232

23

La Vallée

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

151

Appendix 4: Distance and number of migrants by department
Artibonite
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Anse Rouge

Number of migrants

32.79

749

20.2

516

Dessalines

20.24

321

Ennery

18.39

248

Estère

15.16

286

Grande Saline

33.47

118

Gros Morne

18.45

942

La Chapelle

59.29

0

Marmelade

32.8

142

Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite

37.61

59

Saint Marc

33.88

167

Saint Michel de l'Attalaye

34.26

277

Terre Neuve

17.76

898

Verrettes

44.15

50

Desdunes

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

Grande Anse
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Number of migrants

Abricots

16.54

276

Anse d'Hainault

38.23

31

113.31

2

Baradères

93.37

5

Beaumont

25.65

144

Bonbon

11.59

108

Chambellan

19.23

178

Corail

20.59

101

Dame Marie

30.03

57

L'Asile

97.18

0

Les Irois

46.71

12

129.24

1

Moron

14.31

153

Pestel

30.32

68

Petit Trou de Nippes

123.75

0

Petite Rivière de Nippes

119.08

0

10.29

248

Anse-à-Veau

Miragoane

Roseaux
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

152

Centre
Cities

Distance from the Dpt
capital

Number of migrants

Belladère

65.85

10

Boucan Carré

39.53

3

Cerca Carvajal

14.51

110

Cerca la Source

24.83

56

Lascahobas

48.74

10

Maïssade

11.25

160

Mirebalais

34.99

20

Saut d'Eau

44.74

8

Savanette

58.4

20

Thomassique

14.51

88

Thomonde

11.64

35

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

North
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Acul du Nord

10.65

Number of migrants
1109

Bahon

23.96

0

Bas Limbé

19.28

295

Borgne

33.79

1375

Dondon

19.79

1316

Grde Rivière du Nord

14.24

1170

La Victoire

43.95

62

Limbé

15.67

1512

9.15

1311

Milot

11.48

1167

Pignon

38.56

308

Pilate

38.72

756

8.25

1650

Plaisance

29.49

608

Port Margot

21.41

1880

5.94

496

Ranquitte

29.23

227

St Raphaël

27.19

808

Limonade

Plaine du Nord

Quartier Morin

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

153

North East
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Number of migrants

Capotille

21.82

33

Caracol

20.68

5

Carice

31.39

5

Ferrier

5.33

104

Mombin Crochu

37.77

2

Mont Organisé

26.31

2

Ouanaminthe

13.1

125

Perches

15.98

17

Sainte Suzanne

21.71

17

Terrier Rouge

11.05

325

Trou du Nord

15.18

77

Vallières

22.42

117

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

North West
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Number of migrants

Anse à Foleur

16.71

823

Baie de Henne

67.74

9

Bassin Bleu

15.52

371

Bombardopolis

54.24

67

Chansolme

5.33

358

Jean Rabel

27.2

1576

10

717

Môle Saint Nicolas

44.24

145

Saint Louis du Nord

8.04

932

La Tortue

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003
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South

Cities
Aquin

Distance

Number of migrants
33.39

52

Arniquet

9.89

122

14.91

137

Cavaillon

12.1

73

Chantal

12.9

235

Chardonnières

41.52

310

Côteaux

30.88

188

Les Anglais

46.49

172

Maniche

12.76

53

Port-à-Piment

36.35

106

Port-Salut

16.33

118

Roche-à-BΓteau

27.65

98

Saint Jean du Sud

14.1

215

Saint Louis du Sud

20.99

99

Tiburon

61.31

217

Torbeck

5.37

647

Camp-Perrin

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003

South East
Cities

Distance from the
Dpt capital

Number of migrants

Anse à Pitres

92.91

46

Bainet

18.75

127

Belle Anse

48.82

179

9.46

129

Côtes de Fer

39.56

20

Grand Gosier

66.15

8

La Vallée

12.72

30

Marigot

14.91

148

Thiotte

69.31

23

Cayes-Jacmel

Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003
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